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Evaluating Trickle Down Charity  
A SOLUTION FOR DETERMINING WHEN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AIMED AT REVITALIZING 
AMERICA’S CITIES AND REGIONS IS REALLY 
CHARITABLE 
Matthew J. Rossman† 
INTRODUCTION 
Encouraging business creation and job growth by 
providing direct financial support, technical assistance, and 
other aid to private enterprises has become a nearly ubiquitous, 
core component of revitalization strategies in communities of 
every size and shape across America.1 There is good reason for 
such a significant focus on this type of place-based economic 
development.2 A favorable business climate within a place—be it 
a neighborhood, a city, a region, or a country—is critical to its 
 
 † Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would 
like to thank my colleagues Jonathan Entin, Paul Feinberg, Jessie Hill, Erik Jensen 
and Ken Margolis at Case Western Reserve University School of Law for reviewing and 
critiquing drafts of this article. I would also like to acknowledge the valuable research 
assistance provided by Erin Davis and Virginia (Mimi) Woelper, and the early 
brainstorming done on this topic with the law students in my Urban Development Lab: 
Erin Davis, Jordan Graham, Yeheng (Tracy) Li, Rachel Hessler Lyons, and Mandy 
McNabb. The contributions of all of the above helped make this a stronger piece and I 
am truly grateful to them. 
 1 See, e.g., Louise Story, Lines Blur As Texas Gives Industries Bonanza, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/us/winners-and-
losers-in-texas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (referring to a NEW YORK TIMES investigation 
revealing that state and local governments across the country give incentives to private 
businesses totaling $80 billion a year). 
 2 “Economic development” is commonly understood to mean the strategic 
structuring, restructuring and/or growth of an economy to enhance the economic well-being 
of people that live in a particular place. Economic Development Reference Guide, INT’L ECON. 
DEV. COUNCIL (2005), http://www.iedconline.org/?p=ED_Reference_Guide. “Place-based” 
economic development strategies are often distinguished from “people-based” economic 
development strategies, with the former focused on improving the climate for business 
within a place and the latter focused on improving access of individuals to economic 
opportunities (whether or not those opportunities are located in the place in which they 
reside). Randall Crane & Michael Manville, People or Place? Revisiting the Who Versus the 
Where of Urban Development, 20 LAND LINES 2, 2, 7 (July 2008). 
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sustainability.3 Places that foster the creation and growth of 
businesses and startup companies create jobs at disproportionately 
high rates.4 In turn, places that create jobs draw people, resources, 
and vitality; those that lose jobs fail at those things.5 Relatively 
recent market forces like globalization and increased technological 
connectivity have only intensified the competition for sustainability 
by increasing the field of places for businesses and jobs to locate 
and the speed at which places become winners and losers.6 
Notwithstanding perceptions of the American economy 
as a free market, its government at all levels is a huge player 
in fostering place-based economic development.7 Since the 
middle part of the twentieth century, the federal government 
has continuously, and with increasing frequency, rolled out 
incentive programs benefitting private companies designed to 
spur job creation and economic growth in certain American 
communities—typically those suffering some form of economic 
distress.8 During the same period, state and local governments, 
 
 3 See Eben Fodor, Relationship between Growth and Prosperity in the 100 Largest 
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, FODOR & ASSOCIATES.COM, http://www.fodorandassociates.com/
Reports/Growth_&_Prosperity_in_US_MSAs.pdf (Dec. 2010) (examining the relationship 
between growth and economic prosperity in the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas). 
 4 See Frequently Asked Questions, SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_sept_2012.pdf (last updated Sept. 2012). 
Studies of U.S. census data demonstrate that small businesses account for approximately 
65% of all net new jobs created in the country. The number of net new jobs created in the 
United States between 1980 and 2005 roughly equals the number of jobs created by start-up 
companies; see also Kauffman Foundation-Funded U.S. Census Bureau Data Highlight 
Importance of Business Startups to Job Creation in the U.S., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN 
FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/kauffman-foundation-
funded-us-census-bureau-data-highlight-importance-business-startups-1247741.htm. 
 5 See Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, WASH. MONTHLY (May 
2002), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.florida.html (describing 
connection between growing cities and the ability to attract creative and 
entrepreneurial young residents); see also JENNIFER S. VEY ET AL., THE BROOKINGS 
INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, RESTORING PROSPERITY, THE STATE ROLE IN 
REVITALIZING AMERICA’S OLDER INDUSTRIAL CITIES, (2007) (comparing American older 
cities that are prospering with those that are not, and identifying economic stagnancy 
as a critical factor in the condition of less prosperous cities). 
 6 See Robert I. Lerman & Stefanie R. Schmidt, An Overview of Economic, Social, 
and Demographic Trends Affecting the US Labor Market, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/herman/reports/futurework/conference/trends/
Trendsintro.htm (Aug. 1999) (discussing globalization and its impact on US markets). 
 7 Story, supra note 1. 
 8 Major L. Clark & Radwan N. Saade, The Role of Small Business in Economic 
Development of the United States: From the End of the Korean War (1953) to the Present 
(Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, Working Paper 2010), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/7540/12143 (describing the shift in federal economic 
development policies in mid-twentieth century toward place-based development fueled by 
small business creation); see also William H. Simon, The Community Economic 
Development Movement, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 377, 380-87 (2002) (describing federal place-
based economic development programs throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century). Just a few examples include the Economic Development Administration of 
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motivated less by equity and more by self-preservation, have 
jumped into the economic development game with equal zeal 
and creativity.9 State, county, and municipal legislatures have 
equipped their governments with the capacity to extend an 
ever-widening array of tax credits and abatements, grants, and 
publicly financed or guaranteed loans to businesses large and 
small in order to keep them within their political boundaries.10 
More recently, another player, seemingly an even-less 
likely character to foster private sector job creation, has risen to 
prominence: the nonprofit sector. A new wave of nonprofit 
organizations has emerged and is running venture capital funds, 
recruiting companies to major metropolitan areas, providing 
technical assistance to business owners, and in a multitude of 
other ways facilitating targeted economic growth in urban, 
suburban, and rural areas throughout the country.11 These 
organizations, which this article refers to as “regional economic 
development organizations” or “REDOs,” have begun to make a 
significant impact on local and regional job growth in some 
areas,12 and philanthropic and civic forces are increasingly 
 
the 1960s (providing working capital loans to private companies in distressed regions 
coupled with public infrastructure improvements), Empowerment Zones and Enterprise 
Communities in the 1990s (offering packages of grants, regulatory waivers, tax-exempt 
bonding, and other tax benefits to attract businesses within a select group of the nation’s 
most severely distressed urban neighborhoods) and New Market Tax Credits begun in 
first decade of twenty-first century (incentivizing investment by private investors in 
businesses in low-income neighborhoods through offsetting tax credits). 
 9 Michael I. Luger, The Role of Local Government in Contemporary Economic 
Development (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper 2007); Timothy J. 
Bartik, Local Economic Development Policies, (Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, Working Paper 03-91, Jan. 2003). 
 10 See COUNCIL OF DEV. FIN. AGENCIES, http://www.cdfa.net/ (last visited Apr. 
11, 2014) (cataloging programs within state, county, and municipal governments across 
the country that provide or otherwise support economic development financing). 
 11 Research conducted by the author indicates that all 50 major metropolitan 
areas in the United States (as determined by the United States Office of Budget and 
Management) are home to a nonprofit organization the primary mission of which is regional 
job creation through direct aid to for-profit businesses. A majority of the organizations 
identified were formed since 2000. See ERIN DAVIS & MATTHEW J. ROSSMAN, REDOS BY 
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA (2013) (on file with author); see, e.g., ANN ARBOR SPARK, 
http://www.annarborusa.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); BIOCROSSROADS, 
http://www.biocrossroads.com/Home.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); BIOGENERATOR, 
http://www.biogenerator.org/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); THE BIZDOM, 
http://bizdom.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); BRANDERY, http://brandery.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2014); GREATER PHOENIX ECON. COUNCIL, http://www.gpec.org/home (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2014); JUMPSTART, http://www.jumpstartinc.org; INVEST NEBRASKA CORP., 
http://www.investnebraska.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); PITTSBURGH LIFE SCIS. 
GREENHOUSE, http://www.plsg.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 12 See, e.g., Message from Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Erskine, U.S. 
ECON. DEV. ADMIN. (June 2013), www.eda.ogov/news/newsletters/2013/june.htm, (including 
a claim by BioGenerator (St. Louis) that its investments in its portfolio companies 
leveraged $110 million in outside investment in 2012); see also Reports, JUMPSTART, 
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throwing their institutional and financial weight behind them.13 In 
the wake of the “Great Recession” of 2008, REDOs have become a 
darling of politicians and policy makers for engineering America’s 
economic turnaround, as they represent a largely noncontroversial 
blend of pro-business and anti-poverty objectives, while reinforcing 
the country’s entrepreneurial self-image.14 
Central to this article is the recognition that many REDOs 
are operating not only as nonprofit organizations, but as 
charities.15 By “charities,” I mean nongovernmental organizations 
recognized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.16 Section 501(c)(3) 
provides powerful tax, funding, and reputational advantages to 
charities. These include: (1) exemption from federal income tax 
(and, by extension, from many other types of federal, state, and 
local taxes and regulatory laws),17 (2) eligibility to receive 
contributions that are tax-deductible by individual and corporate 
donors from their federal income taxes,18 (3) eligibility for funding 
from government and foundation sources that are either not 
available to or harder to obtain for non-501(c)(3) organizations,19 
and (4) the public credibility associated with having been 
scrutinized by the IRS and recognized as a charity.20 Taken 
 
www.jumpstartinc.org/results/reports.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) (study conducted 
by Cleveland State University, Levin College of Urban Affairs showing early-stage 
companies incubated by JumpStart (Cleveland) generated $270 million in economic 
benefit for Ohio in 2012). 
 13 See THE FOUND. CTR., SPOTLIGHT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
GRANTMAKING IN OHIO (Mar. 2011), http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/
pdf/spotlight_ohio_2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (showing that in Ohio alone, in 
2008, grant awards from the state’s largest foundations to economic development 
organizations totaled $61.8 million dollars, a 152% increase from 4 years earlier). 
 14 See, e. g., Fact Sheet: White House Launches “Startup America” Initiative, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet. 
 15 See DAVIS & ROSSMAN, supra note 11 (showing that 49 out of 50 of the 
metropolitan statistical areas surveyed are home to a REDO recognized as a charity 
under Section 501(c)(3) and that in the one outlier, Las Vegas, plans are in place to 
begin a 501(c)(3) REDO); see also I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2012). 
 16 I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3). 
 17 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides federal income tax exemption for organizations 
described, including those organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable 
purposes. Many states and municipalities provide automatic exemption from state and local 
tax to all organizations that are described in § 501(c)(3). In other states and municipalities, 
organizations must file additional paperwork and/or establish additional facts in order to be 
exempted from applicable income tax. 
 18 I.R.C. § 170 (2010). 
 19 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 49 (10th ed. 
2011); MARILYN E. PHELAN AND ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS LAW 
AND POLICY 169 (3rd ed. 2003). 
 20 James J. Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the 
Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 580 
(2008) (“Traditionally, the recognition of exemption letter has been a seal of approval 
for foundations and other donors.”). 
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together, these advantages amount to a substantial public 
subsidy that incentivizes philanthropic activity. 
The law reserves this subsidy for entities that are 
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, 
which requires, among other things, serving public “rather 
than” private interests.21 Known as the private benefit doctrine, 
this requirement reflects a long-standing principle in the law 
related to charities that, for an organization to merit the 
“charitable subsidy,” the primary and direct beneficiaries of its 
activities must be the members of a charitable class. Any 
resulting benefit to private interests must be an incidental and 
insignificant byproduct of serving this class.22 
So what is the problem? Conceptually, the private 
benefit doctrine would seem to exclude many forms of economic 
development as charitable activity. Intrinsic to the work of 
almost any organization engaged in economic development is 
direct aid to for-profit businesses to generate private benefit 
(and lots of it). In theory, if enough of these businesses 
ultimately succeed, secondary public benefits like the creation 
of jobs or the revitalization of a distressed community follow. 
However, this represents a reversal of how the law defines 
charity—it is privately owned businesses which are the 
primary beneficiaries and the members of the charitable class 
who benefit incidentally. Even at its most altruistic, economic 
development is still “trickle down” charity. 
Moreover, as the practice of charitable economic 
development has become more geographically ambitious and 
sophisticated, the relationship between the businesses aided 
and the benefit to members of a charitable class has become 
more attenuated and less predictable. REDOs exemplify this 
trend. Consider, for example, a REDO that creates a venture 
capital fund to invest in companies across a multi-county 
region that has an unemployment rate above the national 
average. How does one measure the private benefit 
internalized by the companies and their founders versus the 
public benefit enjoyed by the region as a whole and/or those 
individuals experiencing the effects of unemployment? Does an 
investment in a biotechnology company that may grow to 
employ 40 to 50 highly educated individuals serve primarily to 
benefit a disadvantaged region or the company’s founders and 
 
 21 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii)(2008). 
 22 Am. Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1074 (1989). See I.R.S. 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). 
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those employees? Does a loan to retain a business in a 
suburban area 25 miles from the impoverished neighborhoods 
of a region’s anchor city count as the type of “regional” public 
benefit that accomplishes charitable ends? 
Given the potential complexities associated with 
squaring economic development activity with Section 501(c)(3), 
one would assume that there is a careful and consistent 
method for evaluating when a charity engages in work that 
falls under the private benefit doctrine. Unfortunately, for this 
purpose, the tax law’s standard analytic structure is 
rudimentary and abstract. The IRS uses a largely intuitive, gut 
reaction in making an initial determination about private 
benefit when an organization applies for 501(c)(3) status and 
thereafter pays virtually no attention to the organization’s 
achievement of a sufficient public/private benefit balance.23 
Although the standard practice may work well enough for 
more conventional charities like soup kitchens and afterschool 
programs, it is too blunt an instrument to adequately measure 
and decipher the relationship between public and private benefit 
generated by the activities of twenty-first century economic 
development organizations. Considering that the private benefit 
doctrine should be the critical factor in assessing when economic 
development is charitable, the status quo is problematic. 
The principal consequence is that a growing number of 
economic development organizations take full advantage of the 
significant tax and funding benefits and related goodwill 
associated with 501(c)(3) status even though they are directing 
aid to businesses and individuals who may be anything but 
distressed, without demonstrating benefit to those considered 
to be proper recipients of charity. Millions of tax-advantaged 
dollars24 intended for charitable purposes flow to organizations 
that are not accountable. Many economic development charities 
are clearly accomplishing charitable purposes. But the lack of 
accountability means that others are not, and yet are 
benefitting from the charitable subsidy and, in some instances, 
attracting funds that would otherwise support genuinely 
charitable causes.25 The IRS has the responsibility to scrutinize 
charities carefully in order to protect the integrity of the 
charitable sector and prevent misuse of the substantial public 
subsidy that the sector enjoys. Given that regions across the 
 
 23 See infra Part IV.A & C. 
 24 See e.g., THE FOUND. CTR., supra note 13. 
 25 See infra Part IV.D. 
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country are utilizing REDOs at an increasing rate, the time is 
ripe to address this problem. 
This article examines the recent evolution of charitable 
economic development, how the current jurisprudence and IRS 
practices assess it, and how these could be changed to better 
decipher when economic development is really charitable. 
Ultimately, this article proposes that the IRS apply the private 
benefit doctrine more carefully, consistently, and frequently to 
economic development organizations claiming charitable status. 
Part I briefly discusses the genesis and expansion of 
charitable economic development. Parts II and III summarize 
the law of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code as it 
relates to private benefit generally and organizations engaged 
in charitable economic development specifically. Part IV makes 
a fuller case for why the current jurisprudence and the IRS do 
not adequately assess and monitor charitable organizations 
engaged in twenty-first century economic development and the 
harm that results. Part V identifies a range of possible 
solutions to this problem and considerations to bear in mind 
when choosing among these solutions. Finally, Part VI sets 
forth my recommended solution. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BY 
AMERICAN CHARITIES  
A. An Overview 
Briefly examining the history and evolution of place-
based charitable economic development in the United States 
aids in understanding why Section 501(c)(3) jurisprudence 
relating to these organizations evolved as it did and why the 
time is ripe for readdressing it. 
Despite a popular perception of charity as acts of 
compassion that meet the most basic needs of the poor, the 
relationship between economic development—in the sense of 
providing opportunities for gainful employment—and charity is 
actually long-standing and deeply rooted in Anglo-American 
culture.26 Charity connected to providing the mechanisms for 
cultivating wealth reflects an intrinsic American value—that 
promoting entrepreneurship and economic self-sufficiency 
addresses the root cause of poverty rather than merely 
 
 26 Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of 
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2451 (2005). 
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alleviating its symptoms.27 This is evidenced throughout the 
history of American charity, from its early influence in the 
ascetic Protestantism and industrious spirit of prominent 
colonialist-era thinkers like Cotton Mather and Benjamin 
Franklin, to the “friendly visitors” and “scientific philanthropy” 
movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, all of which emphasized the promotion of work and 
enterprise over indiscriminate almsgiving as the more 
appropriate approach to meeting the needs of the poor.28 
Also well-entrenched is the notion that economic 
development has the potential to address the broader needs of 
an entire community, rather than just the basic sustenance of 
needy individuals. One early American example is the debate 
between prominent black leaders Booker T. Washington and 
W.E.B. DuBois around the turn of the nineteenth century over 
the role of business ownership and economic independence 
within the black community as a way of achieving political 
enfranchisement and civil rights for recently emancipated 
slaves.29 This concept has carried over and expanded greatly into 
modern day movements like social entrepreneurship and venture 
philanthropy which attempt to apply for-profit business models 
and market-oriented solutions to societal challenges like 
protecting the environment, eradicating urban food deserts, and 
ensuring fair wages to low-income migrant workers.30 As for 
economic development specifically aimed at revitalizing 
geographically defined communities and implemented by 
“charities,” it was the Community Economic Development (CED) 
movement in the 1960s that brought this strategy to prominence. 
B. Community Economic Development 
The genesis of CED was largely influenced by the 
failure of the federal government’s partnership with municipal 
agencies and private developers to satisfactorily revitalize 
blighted American urban areas in the 1950s through the Urban 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 2453-54. 
 29 Scott J. Cummings, Community Economic Development As Progressive 
Politics: Toward a Grass-Roots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 
410 (2001). See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Justice Thomas, Race, and the 
Constitution Through the Lens of Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois, 88 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 755 (2011). 
 30 Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2437, 2472 (2009). 
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Renewal program.31 Urban Renewal proved widely unpopular 
and unsuccessful, in part because its top down approach to 
planning and decision-making excluded those who resided in 
the affected areas and often resulted in bulldozing wide swaths 
of buildings occupied by low-income and minority residents and 
replacing them with commercial buildings or vacant lots.32 
In its place came the federal Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964 and the Community Action Program (and later the Special 
Impact Program) which instead delegated governmental 
authority and funding for a wide range of community 
improvement activities to “community action programs” 
organized within distressed communities and involving 
“maximum flexible participation” by community residents.33 This 
model, which was based on a template previously funded by the 
Ford Foundation through its Gray Areas program, came to be 
known as Community Economic Development.34 The need for 
local organizational actors as vehicles to carry out CED gave rise 
to the creation of community development corporations (CDCs).35 
CDCs were typically established as charitable 501(c)(3) 
corporations empowered to meet a broad range of a distressed 
community’s needs. These needs might include acquiring and 
rehabilitating blighted buildings, developing affordable 
housing, managing community-based health centers and credit 
unions, and overseeing the local delivery of social services and 
other public aid programs.36 An important subset of many 
CDCs’ activities also included local economic development as a 
mechanism for creating economic activity and jobs within the 
community.37 Early CDCs provided loans, loan guarantees, and 
 
 31 Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones, What is Community Economic 
Development?, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS, 5-11 (Roger A. Clay Jr. & 
Susan R. Jones, eds. 2009) (discussing the history and background of community 
economic development); see Brian Glick & Matthew J. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal 
Services as House Counsel to Community-Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The 
East Brooklyn Experience, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 105, 107 (1997). 
 32 Simon, supra note 8; see also David J. Barron, The Community Economic 
Development Movement: A Metropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN L. REV. 701, 706-08 (2003) (noting 
that tenants and homeowners already in place often fared poorly under Urban Renewal). 
 33 See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 201, 78 Stat. 
508 (1964) (repealed 1981). 
 34 Clay & Jones, supra note 31, at 7. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Cummings, supra note 29, at 438-41; Glick & Rossman, supra note 
31, at 107-08. 
 37 Glick & Rossman, supra note 31, at 109; see Cummings, supra note 29 at 
401-08; Michael Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corporations in 
Inner-City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 753, 768 (1997) 
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stock purchases as specialized financing for businesses and 
cooperatives owned by community members who did not meet 
the lending standards of conventional lenders.38 They developed 
retail centers to provide local shopping and other amenities in 
places conventional developers would not touch.39 Occasionally 
they even owned and operated local companies (usually with 
the intention that stock in these companies would be made 
available to employees and local residents).40 
There was little question that community economic 
development qualified as charitable economic development even 
though it aided for-profit businesses. The missions of CDCs 
revolved around the re-development of relatively small and 
geographically distinct neighborhoods in heightened states of 
distress due to high rates of poverty, blight, and deterioration.41 
CED is a comprehensive approach, addressing a wide range of 
causes and complications of poverty, and, thus, the particular 
activities a CDC undertook were necessarily tied to the needs of 
the community it served.42 In other words, when CDCs engaged 
in economic development, it was in response to an identified 
need of a distressed community. Adding credibility to this 
assessment was the fact that the leadership of CDCs, by 
design, was largely composed of, sought input from, and was 
ultimately accountable to the residents and other stakeholders 
of the poor and distressed communities they served.43 As Part 
III of this article later explains, the IRS rulings that continue to 
govern the agency’s approach to charitable economic development 
 
(“[O]ne objective common to virtually all CDCs is the desire to generate economic 
opportunity and jobs for the residents of their communities.”). 
 38 COLEMAN ET AL., THE NATIONAL HOUSING & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
LAW PROJECT, A LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON COMMUNITY-BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
15-17 (1974). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Cummings, supra note 29, at 415-16 (discussing the roots of modern 
CDCs in distressed urban neighborhoods); Barron, supra note 32, at 714. 
 42 NEAL R. PIERCE & CAROL F. STEINBACH, CORRECTIVE CAPITALISM: THE 
RISE OF AMERICA’S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 20-21 (1987); Ben 
Quinones, Serving Clients in New Ways: Community Economic Development, CED on 
the Job, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 773, 773-74 (1993). 
 43 See Anna Clark, Welcome to Your New Government: Can Non-Profits Run 
Cities?, FOREFRONT (Next Am. City, Phila., PA), at 1, http://nextcity.org/forefront/view/
welcome-to-your-new-government (“[T]he key way that CDCs establish themselves as 
representatives of their community is by allotting a certain number of seats on their board 
to residents.”); see also NAT’L CONG. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., Reaching New Heights: Trends 
and Achievements of Community-Based Development Organizations, NAT’L CONG. FOR 
CMTY. ECON. DEV. 4, 7 (2005), http://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-
wealth.org/files/downloads/report-ncced.pdf.  
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were handed down in the 1970s, when nonprofit economic 
development organizations were predominantly CDCs.44 
Despite the eventual demise in the 1970s of the federal 
programs that gave rise to them, CDCs proved to be very 
resilient and are now a pervasive component of strategies for 
addressing the needs of both low and moderate income 
communities throughout the country.45 While many still operate 
under the guise of a traditional CDC located in storefronts in the 
center of the neighborhoods they serve, these days an 
increasingly complex network of financial intermediaries, 
technical assistance providers, and national foundations help to 
facilitate CED. CDCs themselves have taken on more 
complicated structures and activities, particularly in the economic 
development arena.46 Even so, CED is still viewed primarily as a 
poverty alleviation and blight amelioration strategy confined to 
distressed areas and, thus, as firmly charitable.47 
C. Regional Economic Development 
The emergence of CED in the 1960s did not represent an 
abdication of place-based economic development by other 
interests. As described in the Introduction, the government has 
played an ever-increasing role in promoting place-based 
economic development.48 Another set of stakeholders includes 
businesses (especially those headquartered in a community), 
local foundations, and nonprofit institutions (like hospitals, the 
arts, universities, and schools) that have “sticky capital” in a 
community.49 In some instances, these stakeholders are well 
 
 44 Infra Part III. 
 45 According to a 2005 census, the number of CDCs nationally had grown 
from approximately 100 in the 1960s to approximately 4,600 in 2005. Reaching New 
Heights, supra note 43 at 8. There are CDCs in urban and rural areas in all 50 states 
with diverse programs and objectives. Dana A. Thompson, The Role of Nonprofits in 
CED, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 58 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & 
Susan R. Jones, eds. 2009). 
 46 See Reaching New Heights, supra note 43, at 19-20 (noting that the 
community development field began to attract new money from state and local 
governments, foundations, banks, corporations, and religious organizations, which are 
helping to drive the field forward); see also Schill, supra note 37, at 753 (describing the 
various roles CDCs are playing in economic development: development catalyst, 
developer/landlord and equity investor in business enterprises). 
 47 See generally Cummings, supra note 29. 
 48 Supra INTRODUCTION; see generally VEY ET AL., supra note 5. 
 49 See VEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 40-41. “Sticky Capital” is a phrase used 
frequently by Ted Howard of the Democracy Collaborative to describe investments in a 
community that are unlikely to “get up and leave” to another part of the country. 
Examples include college campuses, hospitals, and nonprofit foundations that have a 
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integrated in localized CED strategies spearheaded by a CDC.50 
However, increasingly more often over the past few decades, 
these stakeholders are also or instead involved in broader efforts 
to address economic development across a city, a region, or even 
an entire state carried out by independent nongovernmental, 
nonprofit organizations.51 It is these organizations that this 
article categorizes as regional economic development 
organizations (REDOs). 
The rise in REDOs is attributable to several factors, 
three of which are emphasized here. The first is the more 
formalized role that the so-called corporate elite began to play 
in urban economic planning and development beginning in the 
1980s in cities across the country. Nestled within any 
American city of a significant size is a network of business, 
political, and other institutional leaders whose professional 
interests are closely linked to local development and growth, 
and who have the means and influence to impact it.52 One 
commentator has coined this network the “growth machine.”53 
While informally influential from the times these cities 
first emerged, the growth machine in many of America’s 
eastern and midwestern cities also began to coalesce in the 
1980s into nonprofit organizations set up for the specific 
purpose of counteracting the impact on these cities caused by 
the decline in manufacturing and heavy industry.54 From 
Cleveland to Charlotte and Hartford to Kansas City, the 
leaders of those companies that profited when times were good 
entered into public-private partnerships with local 
governments and foundations to draw up and implement 
blueprints for economic survival and retrenchment, as well as 
 
long history in a particular community. See, e.g., Ted Howard & Steve Dubb, 
Leveraging Anchor Institutions for Local Job Creation and Wealth Building, in BIG 
IDEAS FOR JOBS (Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor & Employment ed., 2012), 
available at www.irle.berkeley.edu/research/jobcreation/howard_2011ppt. 
 50 Reaching New Heights, supra note 43, at 7 (discussing CDCs as 
organizations, showing a chart of CDC’s service areas and noting that two-thirds of 
CDCs have a distinctly local focus). 
 51 See VEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 68. 
 52 See generally BUSINESS ELITES AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDIES 
AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Scott Cummings ed. 1988). 
 53 See Harvey Molotch, Strategies and Constraints of Growth Elites, in 
BUSINESS ELITES AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDIES AND CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 25 (Scott Cummings ed. 1988). 
 54 Patricia Atkins et al., Responding to Manufacturing Job Loss: What Can 
Economic Development Policy Do, BROOKINGS METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAM (2011). 
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physical redevelopment.55 This model of economic development 
has persisted and expanded throughout the country, buoyed by 
an infusion of public and philanthropic dollars.56 In most cases, 
these coalitions now include a widening array of partners 
including representatives from hospitals, universities, 
foundations, and new and emerging businesses.57 
A second factor is the broadening range of circumstances 
in which regions are utilizing REDOs. Communities are no 
longer “hold[ing] off on pursuing economic development 
strategies until the bottom falls out of the local economy”; they 
are taking a longer-range view of economic development and 
pursuing preventative strategies to ward off economic decline 
before it starts to take hold.58 Economic development has become 
a matter of significant public concern and focus, regardless of 
whether a region is poor, affluent, or somewhere in between.59 
Third, there is a growing consensus among those who 
practice and analyze local economic development that the 
individual economies of small geographic areas like 
neighborhoods and even cities are less relevant in the face of 
globalization. Local political boundaries are less relevant 
because metropolitan regions must compete for jobs and 
companies on a global basis.60 The notion that one neighborhood 
or municipality within a larger region “wins” by attracting a 
business from an adjoining neighborhood or municipality is 
rapidly being replaced by the belief that each region must 
identify and coordinate its distinctive strengths and assets if it 
 
 55 Id.; David O. Renz, The Case of Kansas City, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA (Charles T. Clotfetter & Thomas 
Ehrlich, eds. 2001). 
 56 See, e.g., THE FOUND. CTR., supra note 13. 
 57 Ted Howard & Steve Dubb, Leveraging Anchor Institutions for Local Job 
Creation and Wealth Building, in BIG IDEAS FOR JOBS (Berkeley Institute for Research 
on Labor & Employment ed., 2012). 
 58 Tomer J. Inbar, Charities and Economic Development, in GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM ON REPRESENTING AND 
MANAGING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.morganlewis.com/
pubs/inbar_georgetown06-economicdevel.pdf. 
 59 See Growing Your Region’s Economy with Small Businesses and Entrepreneurs, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF DEV. ORGS. RESEARCH FOUND. (Dec. 2011), http://www.nado.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/rlf2012.pdf (stating that there are over 500 regional economic 
development organizations in the U.S. that are composed principally of local 
governmental officials and charged generally with developing and implementing regional 
economic development policies). These organizations cover virtually every section of the 
United States. 2011 RDO Organizational Data Profiles, NAT’L ASS’N OF DEV. ORGS. 4 
http://www.nado.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/2011-National-Profiles-of-RDOs-
FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
 60 Claire Felbinger & James Rohey, Globalization’s Impact on State and 
Local Policy: The Rise of Regional Cluster Based Economic Development Strategies, 18 
REV. POL’Y RESEARCH 63, 64-79 (2001). 
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hopes to survive in an era when jobs and capital can easily find 
lower cost alternatives in other regions or countries.61 In this way, 
economic development must extend beyond the boundaries of 
highly distressed communities if it is to make a sustainable impact. 
D. What Are REDOs and What Do They Do? 
While REDOs resemble CDCs in encouraging and 
facilitating place-based economic development, they differ in 
significant ways. CDCs typically serve relatively confined areas 
with high concentrations of poverty: a poor neighborhood or 
cluster of neighborhoods in urban settings, or a larger 
contiguous poor area in rural settings where there is less 
population density.62 REDOs, on the other hand, normally serve 
one or more contiguous metropolitan areas in urban settings, or 
an area as large as an entire state in rural settings.63 The service 
area of a REDO usually contains multiple sub-communities that 
are faring differently in terms of economic health, household 
income, individual educational attainment, and other 
demographics that reflect an area’s relative wealth.64 
Accordingly, REDOs serve an area large enough that they 
include sections that are distressed, some that are prosperous, 
and others that fall somewhere in between.65 
CDCs address a comprehensive range of needs within a 
community, including economic development,66 while REDOs 
focus exclusively on economic development.67 The leadership of 
a CDC typically represents a broad cross-section of stakeholders 
in the community it serves and is elected by community 
residents.68 REDOs, on the other hand, are typically governed by 
 
 61 Mark Drabensott, Rethinking Federal Policy For Regional Economic 
Development, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV. (2006), http://www.kc.frb.org/
publicat/econrev/PDF/1q06drab.pdf. 
 62 See Reaching New Heights, supra note 43, at 7-8; see also THOMPSON, 
supra note 45, at 58. 
 63 See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECONOMIC COUNCIL, supra note 11 (serving 
23 communities including and surrounding Phoenix, AZ); JUMPSTART, 
http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus/whatwedo.aspx (2014) (serving 21 counties of 
Northeast Ohio); INVEST NEBRASKA CORP., www.investnebraska.com/about-us/whom-
we-serve/ (2014) (service area includes entire state of Nebraska). 
 64 See, e.g., Mapping Poverty in America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2014/01/05/poverty-map/. (mapping the diversity 
in wealth of the areas served by the REDOs cited in preceding footnote).  
 65 See, e.g., Mapping Poverty in America, supra note 64. 
 66 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
 67 See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECONOMIC COUNCIL, http://www.gpec.org/
about-us; JUMPSTART, http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus.aspx; BIOGENERATOR, 
http://www.biogenerator.org/ (2014).  
 68 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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self-perpetuating boards consisting largely of business leaders 
and economic development experts, many of whom are not 
directly accountable to those who live within the region.69 
To provide a better sense of what REDOs do and the 
context in which they do it, brief descriptions of three 
hypothetical REDOs are set forth below. These descriptions 
closely mirror types of REDOs that are being utilized with 
increasing frequency by communities across the country and are 
often recognized by the IRS as charities.70 
1. The Business Accelerator71  
This organization is located in a large city in an area of 
the country that is considered economically depressed. The city 
is afflicted by many indicators of distress, including blighted 
and abandoned properties, high unemployment rates, high 
crime, and low high school and college graduation rates among 
its residents. The Business Accelerator seeks to help grow the 
economic base not only in the city but also in its surrounding 
region by assisting entrepreneurs leading high growth 
potential companies across the entire 15 county region that 
surrounds the city. This type of organization operates under 
the premise that, by helping local entrepreneurs get through 
the early stages when many companies fail, more companies 
will get off the ground, expand, and remain in the region, and 
thus expand local job opportunities. 
The Business Accelerator’s largest program activity 
involves making seed capital investments in early-stage ideas 
and small companies to help them grow to a point where they 
can bring their products and services to market and attract more 
conventional sources of financing. Once it makes an investment, 
the Business Accelerator matches the company with one of its 
“entrepreneurs in residence” to help guide the company’s 
leadership during the term of the Business Accelerator’s 
investment. The Business Accelerator’s other services include 
connecting entrepreneurs to other sources of capital and 
providing low cost or no cost technical assistance to business 
 
 69 See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECONOMIC COUNCIL, supra note 67; 
JUMPSTART (2014), http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus.aspx; BIOGENERATOR (2014), 
http://www.biogenerator.org/. 
 70 See Davis & Rossman, supra note 11, for a representative list of REDOs, all of 
which the IRS has determined to be 501(c)(3) organizations operating for charitable purposes. 
 71 The organization described as The Business Accelerator resembles 
JumpStart, Inc., based in Cleveland, Ohio. See JUMPSTART, supra note 11. 
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owners on issues like public relations and marketing, identifying 
and attracting employees with the right skills, commercializing a 
technology, generating sales, achieving milestones, and most 
other issues that a startup business would face. 
The Business Accelerator receives its financial support 
from a wide range of regionally based charitable foundations 
and individual and corporate donors, as well as from state 
government. Its board of directors consists primarily of local 
business leaders, who are themselves usually successful 
entrepreneurs, with some representatives from civic 
organizations and government. 
2. The Biotech Incubator72  
This organization is located in a region that, while not 
technically economically depressed, has stagnant job growth 
rates and an aging economic base typified by companies 
founded and headquartered in the region many decades ago 
that no longer provide the number of jobs they once did. The 
Biotech Incubator’s mission is to facilitate the formation of 
science, research-based, and technology companies to support 
new economic development and job growth in the region. The 
organization was established and is funded and overseen by 
local business, research, and university leaders who decided to 
draw upon the region’s historic universities and research 
institutions to re-position the region against increasing 
domestic and global competition for new companies and 
talented young workers. 
The Biotech Incubator engages in several types of 
activities specifically tailored to incubating new biotech 
companies. The organization works closely with regional 
universities and research institutions to identify promising ideas, 
technologies, and inventions, and to educate the associated 
researchers and entrepreneurs about commercialization and 
business development possibilities. It provides additional 
assistance to promising candidates through business plan 
development and, in some cases, serves as part of a new 
company’s management team during its early phases. The 
organization helps companies it works with to identify, apply 
for, and communicate with providers of promising sources of 
capital, while also working to attract venture capital funds to 
 
 72 The organization described as The Biotech Incubator resembles 
BioGenerator, based in St. Louis, MO. See BIOGENERATOR, supra note 11. 
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the region. Finally, the Biotech Incubator operates “Accelerator 
Labs,” which consist of wet laboratory and office space that it 
makes available to early-stage companies at below market 
rates or for free (under some circumstances). These labs allow 
the companies to focus on demonstrating the viability of their 
technology by defraying the early stage costs of purchasing 
equipment and renting laboratory space. 
3. The Regional Business Advocate73 
This organization is located in a region of the country 
that is experiencing both economic and population growth, 
anchored by a city that is already prosperous, but positioning 
itself to grow. The Regional Business Advocate seeks to 
cultivate industries that bring high-quality, high-wage jobs to 
the city and its surrounding counties, with a specialized focus 
on attracting renewable energy and international companies. 
It carries out this mission through three primary and 
closely related categories of activities. The first is business 
development. The organization participates in efforts to lure 
companies and jobs to relocate to the region by helping connect 
prospective companies and governmental agencies that are 
sources of tax credits and other relocation assistance, 
promoting legislative strategies for adopting business-friendly 
devices like renewable energy tax credits, and hosting company 
and industry leaders on trips to the region. The second is 
marketing. The organization creates films, websites, and other 
materials promoting the region to show to chief executives and 
site selection consultants of companies seeking to relocate. 
Third, the organization identifies industries that have 
significant potential for growth in the region, and produces 
reports on how to target and grow these industries. 
In many ways, the Regional Business Advocate acts like 
an economic development division of local government. But it is 
an independent organization, with roughly equal amounts of 
public and private funding, and a board of directors that 
consists of a combination of business leaders, government 
officials, and heads of universities and local foundations. 
 
 73 The organization described as The Regional Business Advocate resembles 
The Greater Phoenix Economic Council based in Phoenix, AZ. See GREATER PHOENIX 
ECONOMIC COUNCIL, supra note 11. 
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II. ESSENTIALS OF SECTION 501(C)(3) 
Many REDOs operate as charities,74 which is to say that 
the IRS recognizes them as qualifying for tax exemption under 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.75 Qualifying 
under Section 501(c)(3) is the principal step for a nonprofit 
organization to access the substantial public subsidy available 
to charities.76 Before discussing how the IRS applies Section 
501(c)(3) to economic development, it is important to 
understand some of the basic components of Section 501(c)(3), 
with an emphasis on those that relate to the definition of 
“charitable” and the private benefit doctrine. 
A. Eligibility for 501(c)(3) Status 
All organizations described within the 29 subcategories 
of Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code are exempt from 
federal income tax.77 The largest and most well-known 
subcategory is Section 501(c)(3).78 Included within Section 
501(c)(3) are “[c]orporations . . . organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific . . . or educational 
purposes . . . .”79 Although each of these terms has a distinct 
definition under 501(c)(3),80 each overlaps with the definition of 
charitable and, in fact, almost all organizations seeking 
501(c)(3) status for place-based economic development work 
seek to justify their activities as furthering “charitable” 
purposes.81 For simplicity’s sake, this article refers to any 
economic development conducted by a 501(c)(3) organization as 
“charitable economic development.” 
 
 74 See Davis & Rossman, supra, note 11. 
 75 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 76 See supra text accompanying notes 17-20. 
 77 I.R.C. § 501(c). 
 78 AMY S. BLACKWOOD ET AL., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC 
CHARITIES, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING, 2012, 1-2 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.urban.org/
publications/412674.html (documenting that in 2010 there were 1.6 million 
organizations registered with the IRS under section 501(c), nearly 1.1 million of which 
were recognized as 501(c)(3) organizations). 
 79 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added). There are other categories of purposes 
listed in section 501(c)(3), but they are more obscure and not related to the topic at hand. 
 80 I.R.S. Pub. 557, 46573C (Oct. 2013). 
 81 See generally JANE C. NOBER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A LEGAL GUIDE 
FOR GRANTMAKERS 1-29 (2005). I am excluding from this article discussion of economic 
development organizations that seek 501(c)(3) status purely for educational (e.g. a 
business incubator set up as part of a university’s MBA program) or scientific (e.g. to 
fund research in a particular field) purposes as these organizations are not principally 
pursuing charitable objectives. 
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The word “charitable” is defined in the regulations 
amplifying the Internal Revenue Code (the IRC Regulations) 
both broadly by reference to the “generally-accepted legal 
sense” of the word as well as by reference to a list of specific 
purposes the word is understood to include.82 Most pertinent 
from this list of specific purposes for economic development 
organizations are “relief of the poor and distressed or of the 
underprivileged”; “promotion of social welfare by organizations 
designed . . . to lessen neighborhood tensions[,] . . . eliminate 
prejudice and discrimination[,] . . . or . . . combat community 
deterioration”; and “lessening of the burdens of Government.”83 
Subject to a few exceptions, any organization that wishes to be 
recognized as qualifying under Section 501(c)(3) must submit 
an application to the IRS demonstrating that it is organized for 
and its activities will exclusively further these types of 
purposes and receive an IRS determination letter officially 
recognizing its 501(c)(3) status.84 
B. The Private Benefit Doctrine 
Nestled well within the IRC Regulations amplifying 
Section 501(c)(3) is the “private benefit doctrine.” It is rooted in 
language stating that an organization is not organized or 
operated exclusively for exempt purposes under Section 501(c)(3) 
“unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.”85 
Although this phrase has generated considerable 
confusion as to how and when the private benefit doctrine 
applies,86 there is a near-consensus among commentators, 
courts, and the IRS on several critical points. First, the private 
benefit doctrine derives from the operational test of Section 
501(c)(3); in other words, it clarifies that an organization 
cannot be operated exclusively for exempt purposes, no matter 
what it states as its purposes, unless its activities in fact 
 
 82 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (2013). 
 83 Id.; see also Instructions for IRS Form 1023 (June 2006). 
 84 I.R.C. § 508(a) (2012) (requiring that organizations requesting recognition 
under section 501(c)(3) submit an application, subject to certain exceptions). In 
addition to demonstrating that it is organized for and its activities further charitable 
purposes exclusively, the organization must also convince the IRS that it will avoid 
certain activities that 501(c)(3) prohibits including (i) lobbying (beyond an 
insubstantial amount), (ii) political campaigning, and (iii) allowing those who control 
the organization from unduly profiting based on their positions of control (what the 
statute characterizes as “private inurement”). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 85 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii). 
 86 John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1064 
(2006) (discussing the difficulty of defining the private benefit doctrine). 
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primarily result in public benefit.87 Second, although the “rather 
than” language in the regulation implies that the organization 
cannot serve any private interest, the correct interpretation of 
this phrase is that any benefit to private interests arising from 
the organization’s activities must result only incidentally from 
serving public interests.88 Finally, the private benefit doctrine 
applies to all those who benefit from the organization’s activities 
and not just to those who control the organization.89 
So, conceptual issues aside, what does the private benefit 
doctrine really mean? Read literally, it means that the activities 
of a 501(c)(3) organization must principally benefit the public 
and not private individuals or companies. Of course, the service 
of public and private interests cannot be understood as mutually 
exclusive concepts. The public is composed of individuals, so any 
benefit to the public necessarily benefits private individuals.90 
Those who are patients of charitable hospitals receive medical 
care, those who attend the symphony hear music, and those who 
go to a soup kitchen receive a free meal. 
Rather, private benefit is thought of as benefit bestowed 
upon individuals who are not part of the group of individuals who 
are the intended beneficiaries of the organization’s charitable 
purpose (the organization’s charitable class). Thus, the charitable 
class for the hospital is its patients, for the symphony is its 
listeners, and for the soup kitchen is those who are hungry and 
without adequate means to provide food for themselves. In each 
case, benefit bestowed upon members of the charitable class is 
considered public benefit and, therefore, acceptable.91 
The private benefits generated by the activities of a 
charity are typically not limited to the members of its 
charitable class, however. The hospital must pay its doctors 
 
 87 This point is clear given the language of the regulation from which the 
private benefit doctrine arises (“An organization is not organized or operated exclusively 
for one or more of the purposes specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph unless it 
serves a public rather than a private interest.”). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii); see 
also HOPKINS, supra note 19, at § 20.11; Daryll K. Jones, Third-Party Profit-Taking in 
Tax Exemption Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 977, 998 (2007). 
 88 See Jones, supra note 87, at 998-1002. 
 89 Accordingly, the private benefit doctrine is distinct from Section 501(c)(3)’s 
express prohibition on taking the profits of the organization, which applies only to those 
who are in control of it. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989) 
(determining that “nonincidental benefits conferred on disinterested persons may serve 
private interests”); see also Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47, 74 (1999). 
 90 Andrew Morgan et al., Private Benefit Under IRC 501(c)(3), in IRS EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2001, 
135-36, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub (follow “irs-tege” hyperlink; then follow 
“ectopich01.pdf” hyperlink); see also Colombo, supra note 86, at 1070. 
 91 Jones, supra note 87, at 979-80. HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 166-68.  
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and nurses and purchase medical supplies from outside 
vendors, the symphony must pay its musicians and rent a 
music hall, and the soup kitchen may have to purchase food 
and supplies from grocery stores. This is where the concept of 
incidental private benefit comes into play. A charity is not 
prohibited from benefitting private interests through its 
activities so long as this benefit is incidental to the public 
benefit the charity seeks to accomplish.92 
The law relating to incidental private benefit, while 
longstanding, has only been more fully articulated in the last 
few decades through case law and IRS administrative 
materials.93 It has essentially evolved into a two-part test: (1) 
whether the private benefit in question is a necessary result of 
the accomplishment of the intended public benefit (a qualitative 
test), and (2) whether the private benefit is insubstantial 
relative to the public benefit achieved (a quantitative test).94 To 
use one of the examples described above: are the medical 
supplies purchased by a charitable hospital necessary to 
provide adequate medical care to the hospital’s patients, and is 
the profit received by the supply vendors insubstantial relative 
to the medical care received by the hospital’s patients? The 
benefit must satisfy both the qualitative and quantitative tests 
to be considered incidental.95 
In theory, the IRS applies the private benefit doctrine in 
every evaluation of a prospective 501(c)(3) organization; 
however, there are a number of commonly occurring scenarios 
 
 92 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,589 (Dec. 8, 1986); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). 
 93 See Jones, supra note 87, at 998-1001 (contending that the private benefit 
doctrine was “effectively ignored because it seemed only to state the obvious” until it 
attracted case law and IRS attention in the late 1980s). 
 94 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). Describing a common 
statement of this two-part test: 
Any private benefit arising from a particular activity must be “incidental” in 
both a qualitative and quantitative sense to the overall public benefit 
achieved by the activity if the organization is to remain exempt. To be 
qualitatively incidental, a private benefit must occur as a necessary 
concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large; in other words, 
the benefit to the public cannot be achieved without necessarily benefiting 
private individuals. Such benefits might also be characterized as indirect or 
unintentional. To be quantitatively incidental, a benefit must be insubstantial 
when viewed in relation to the public benefit conferred by the activity. It bears 
emphasis that, even though exemption of the entire organization may be at 
stake, the private benefit conferred by an activity or arrangement is balanced 
only against the public benefit conferred by that activity or arrangement, not 
the overall good accomplished by the organization. 
 95 Id. 
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that implicate the doctrine most directly.96 The one most clearly 
applicable to organizations aspiring to engage in charitable 
economic development involves the instrumentality rule. 
C. The Instrumentality Rule 
The instrumentality rule provides that there are certain 
circumstances in which the IRS will recognize an organization 
as charitable even though the immediate and primary 
beneficiaries of its services are not members of a charitable 
class so long as the ultimate effect of the activity benefits the 
charitable class.97 In these instances, the private interests 
benefitted are considered the “means” or “instruments” to the 
accomplishment of a charitable end.98 The IRS must still be 
convinced, however, that the benefit to private interests in this 
context is necessary and insubstantial relative to the public 
benefit the organization hopes will result. 
One well-known example of this rule is when the IRS 
recognized the exemption of an organization that intended to 
make grants to legal interns (themselves not low-income or 
otherwise distressed) so that the interns could provide free 
legal services to residents of a depressed community.99 The 
organization itself did not provide services to the residents, 
instead relying on the interns to do so. The IRS recognized the 
interns as “merely the instruments by which the charitable 
purposes are accomplished.”100 The IRS has ruled similarly in 
the case of an organization formed in a rural community 
principally to raise funds and construct a medical building to 
lure a doctor to a medically underserved community;101 and 
likewise in the case of an organization that purchased 
guaranteed student loans from banks to create a secondary 
market for these loans and thus indirectly increase the 
availability of financing to those seeking an education.102 The 
 
 96 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(iii), ex. 3 (2008) (when the activities 
of an organization serve to create a market for one particular business or non-exempt 
organization); Wendy L. Parker Rehab. Found. Inc. v. C.I.R., 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 51 (1986) 
(when an organization directs its services at a group of individuals who, although 
otherwise proper recipients of charitable services, are not numerous and undefined 
enough to constitute a charitable class); Jones, supra, note 87, 1003-05 (when an 
organization enters into a profit-sharing arrangement with a for-profit business). 
 97 HOPKINS, supra note 19, at § 6.3(b) (discussing IRS decisions regarding this rule). 
 98 Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 72-559, 1972-2 C.B. 247). 
 99 Rev. Rul. 72-559, 1972-2 C.B. 247. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Rev. Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174. 
 102 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,685 (Dec. 10, 1987). 
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IRS viewed the doctor and the banks, respectively, as private 
instrumentalities essential to cause a desired public benefit. 
III. THE 501(C)(3) JURISPRUDENCE OF CHARITABLE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Concepts like charitable purposes and the private 
benefit doctrine, as set forth in Section 501(c)(3) and the IRC 
Regulations that amplify it, are fairly abstract. These concepts 
are more specifically applied to organizations engaged in 
particular “types” of activities (e.g. housing, economic 
development, and healthcare) in Revenue Rulings that express 
the official position of the IRS on how the law applies to a 
particular set of facts.103 Courts also apply these concepts 
through case law when an organization challenges an IRS 
decision.104 Thus, for each “type” of 501(c)(3) organization, a 
unique jurisprudence develops based on relevant IRS Revenue 
Rulings and case law. An examination of the 503(c)(3) 
jurisprudence relating to charitable economic development 
organizations follows below. 
A. “Aid to the Distressed” Rulings 
The jurisprudence of precedential weight related to the 
most common type of charities engaging in economic 
development—those claiming to aid distressed people and 
places—is contained almost entirely in three IRS Revenue 
Rulings from the 1970s.105 In each of these rulings, the IRS 
analyzed the activities of an organization seeking 501(c)(3) status 
based on whether it “relieve[d] the poor and distressed,” 
“combat[ed] community deterioration,” “eliminate[d] prejudice 
and discrimination,” and/or “lessen[ed] neighborhood tensions.”106 
These are the phrases from the IRC Regulations’ definition of 
“charitable” that best reflect the philanthropic objectives of place-
based economic development.107 They are also, not coincidentally, 
the phrases economic development charities routinely include as 
governing purposes in their charter documents.108 Accordingly, 
 
 103 See HOPKINS, supra note 19, app. A, at 974-76. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Infra text accompanying notes 110-27. 
 106 Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 163. 
 107 Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008). 
 108 See, e.g., Instructions to IRS Form 1023, Part VIII, Line 6a (2006). 
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these three Rulings serve as the cornerstone for analyzing when 
economic development is “charitable.” 
The Rulings are brief and do not follow a consistent or 
explicit analytic structure. To varying degrees, the IRS 
considered the condition of the community that the organization 
sought to serve, the particular businesses it aided, and the 
benefit to the community that this aid would yield. Based on 
this information, the IRS then provided its intuitive sense of 
whether this meant that private business owners or the needy 
would benefit more and ruled accordingly. 
For example, in Revenue Ruling 74-587, the IRS 
recognized an organization as a 501(c)(3) charity even though a 
principal activity of the organization was making low-interest 
or long-term loans to, and equity purchases in, privately owned 
small businesses.109 At the outset, the IRS recognized that the 
areas to which the organization would direct its services would 
be high-density urban communities inhabited mainly by those 
who were minorities or in other disadvantaged groups.110 The 
IRS also recognized an unmet need of the businesses the 
organization planned to aid and the negative impact this was 
having in these communities. Due to a lack of access to capital, 
among other conditions, “many of the businesses located in 
these high-density urban areas have declined or fallen into 
disrepair, and others have ceased to operate.”111 As a result, the 
areas lacked employment opportunities for their residents.112 
The IRS completed its analysis by drawing a connection 
between the businesses the organization would aid and the 
alleviation of local distress. The organization planned to 
consult with other anti-poverty and anti-discrimination 
programs in selecting recipients to coordinate its services with 
articulated community needs and “offer the greatest potential 
community benefit.”113 It would direct its aid to those 
businesses that had not been able to obtain financing from 
conventional sources and would give preference to businesses 
that provided training and employment opportunities for the 
unemployed and underemployed residents of the area.114 In 
closing, the IRS cemented its decision to approve 501(c)(3) 
status by invoking the instrumentality rule: “the recipients of 
 
 109 Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162-63. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 163. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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loans and working capital [who wouldn’t themselves qualify for 
charitable assistance] are merely the instruments by which the 
charitable purposes are sought to be accomplished.”115 
In Revenue Ruling 76-419, the IRS came to the same 
conclusion about an organization that purchased blighted land 
in an economically depressed community, converted the land 
into an industrial park, and leased it on favorable terms to 
attract industrial businesses to move to the park.116 The 
strength of the organization’s claim to charitable status 
followed from the nexus between the businesses it aided and 
the need for jobs among the community’s low-income 
residents.117 To be eligible for the industrial park, businesses 
had to agree in the leases “to hire a significant number of 
presently unemployed persons in the area and to train them in 
needed skills.”118 The industrial park would favor those businesses 
with a need for low skill workers since this was of “greater 
immediate benefit to the surrounding depressed community.”119 
In contrast, in Revenue Ruling 77-111, the IRS denied 
recognition of 501(c)(3) status to two similar organizations, 
both endeavoring to increase the usage of retail businesses 
located in communities suffering from economic decline.120 The 
first organization planned to conduct what essentially 
amounted to advertising and marketing activities to increase 
patronage of local businesses.121 The second planned to 
facilitate construction of a retail center (including a 
department store and shopping mall) to stem the decline of 
retail shopping in the community to outlying (presumably 
suburban) areas.122 Here, the IRS concluded that “the overall 
thrust [was] to promote business[,]” (that is, serve private 
interests), “rather than to accomplish exclusively 501(c)(3) 
objectives” (that is, serve public interests).123 
But what distinguished these organizations from the 
ones described in the previous two Rulings? The IRS did not go 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 Rev. Rule. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146. 
 117 Id. The area had been recognized by the U.S. Economic Development 
Administration as having “a high ratio of unemployed and underemployed low-income 
people and is an area of urban blight consisting primarily of junk yards and vacant land 
with little industry”. Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 145. 
 121 Id. at 144 (providing information on the area’s shopping opportunities, 
local transportation, and accommodations). 
 122 Id. at 144-45. 
 123 Id. 
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into great detail on this point. Its principal contention was that 
the services provided by the organizations in Revenue Ruling 
77-111 would benefit all businesses located in the community 
and in the retail center, respectively, without regard to whether 
they were “owned by minority groups” or whether they were 
experiencing difficulties based on their location in a deteriorated 
section of the community.124 Remarkably, the Ruling makes no 
mention of the extent to which the jobs and economic activity 
associated with the aided businesses would alleviate distress in 
the community served.125 The fact that the organization would 
aid businesses regardless of whether the businesses themselves 
were in some fashion distressed carried the day.126 
These three Rulings provide a rudimentary template for 
analyzing the type of economic development carried out by 
REDOs. If an organization simply promotes business activity in 
a community, it is not charitable even if the community is 
distressed (Revenue Ruling 77-111); if it tailors its assistance 
to businesses encountering some form of hardship or difficulty 
resulting from the distressed community in which they are 
located or seek to locate, it may be charitable depending on the 
circumstances (Revenue Rulings 74-587 and 76-419). No 
subsequent Rulings have modified these decisions, and there is 
no case law on the issue. 
Elucidating “precedential” jurisprudence on tax law 
matters is publicly available non-precedential guidance that the 
IRS provides in the form of (1) private letter rulings (PLRs) 
addressed to individual people and entities that request IRS 
guidance on a specific issue, and (2) internal IRS office memoranda 
(technical advice memoranda and general counsel memoranda) on 
issues that the IRS determines merit the consideration of its in-
house attorneys.127 Although the Internal Revenue Code expressly 
prohibits reliance by the public on these non-precedential 
materials,128 they are useful in understanding the IRS’s position on 
a particular issue, and typically contain more detail and are in 
much greater supply than Revenue Rulings.129 
The IRS has released numerous PLRs over the last three 
decades evaluating the 501(c)(3) eligibility of charitable economic 
development organizations and they all cite to some combination 
 
 124 Id. at 145. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See HOPKINS, supra note 19, app. A, at 978. 
 128 I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3). 
 129 See HOPKINS, supra note 19, app. A, at 978. 
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of the three 1970s era Rulings.130 Only once, in the early 1990s in 
an intra-agency memorandum, did the IRS elaborate on its 
position. In response to a request for a private letter ruling from a 
business incubator offering technical, managerial, and financial 
assistance to businesses in a “depressed” community in America’s 
Rust Belt and some intra-agency disagreement as to how to 
evaluate it, the IRS prepared a General Counsel Memorandum 
synthesizing the 1970s era Rulings.131 
The Memorandum is noteworthy for several reasons. 
First, the IRS explicitly identified the private benefit doctrine 
as the crucial issue in evaluating whether economic 
development is charitable.132 Second, the IRS specifically 
distinguished (and disapproved of) a more liberal, trickle down 
approach to “charitable” economic development that would 
recognize an organization assisting any business in a depressed 
area as charitable (on the theory that increased employment 
increases tax revenues and a general increase in business 
activity is itself inherently beneficial to the area). Instead, the 
IRS seemed insistent on a stricter nexus requirement that 
requires the assistance provided to link to particular problems 
experienced by those residing or trying to operate a business 
within the depressed area.133 In rejecting the former and 
embracing the latter, the IRS made clear its concern that not 
limiting “charitable” assistance to those businesses achieving 
the greatest potential community benefit would “encourage 
private business development while only incidentally 
furthering social welfare purposes.”134 Finally, in consolidating 
the 1970s era Rulings into an explicit three-factor test, the 
Memorandum added some detail and depth to the original 
analysis, including that a charitable incubator must offer its 
services on non-commercial terms, impose significant limitations 
on which geographic areas and businesses are aided and direct 
its services toward those recipients that will offer the greatest 
potential community benefit to the depressed area.135 
While this expanded analysis provided a somewhat 
clearer and fuller template for analyzing economic development 
organizations, it appears that the IRS soon after cast it aside. 
 
 130 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-35-032 (Sept. 2, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 2006-14-030 (Apr. 7, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-47-048 (Nov. 19, 2004); 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-03-083 (Jan. 19, 2001). 
 131 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 26, 1992). 
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It was never incorporated into precedential law, nor has the IRS 
ever referred to it again, except in the private letter ruling that 
was the impetus for the memorandum.136 Instead, subsequent 
IRS letter rulings only reference and reflect the more intuitive 
and less structured approach of the 1970s era Rulings.137 
B. “Lessening the Burdens of Government” Rulings 
Organizations that “lessen[ ]  . . . the burdens of 
government” form a second category of economic development 
organizations that qualify as charities.138 This phrase also appears 
in the definition of “charitable” contained in the IRC Regulations.139 
Although reducing the work of the government may not 
comport with the common perception of charity, it is well-
established under Section 501(c)(3) as a separate, independent 
basis for exemption.140 This basis for exemption is rooted in the 
theory that work that lessens a governmental burden saves 
public money, which promotes the general welfare.141 The U.S. 
tax system does not impose income tax on state or local 
government branches or government instrumentalities, and 
donations to these public entities for public purposes are 
generally tax-deductible.142 Therefore, providing 501(c)(3) status 
for organizations that do the work of government seems equitable. 
At first glance, this phrase appears to open the 
floodgates for many more economic development organizations 
to qualify under Section 501(c)(3). Economic development is a 
common activity for state and local governments regardless of 
the condition of the areas or constituents that they serve.143 A 
broad interpretation of “lessening the burdens of government” 
could encapsulate any organization whose mission overlaps 
with any government function. At least conceptually, however, 
two significant limitations apply. 
 
 136 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-001 (May 1, 1992). 
 137 See rulings cited supra note 130. 
 138 See Instructions to IRS Form 1023, Part VIII, Line 6a (identifying which 
phrases included in the definition of charitable apply to economic development). 
 139 Treas. Reg. 1.501 (c)(3) -1 (d)(2) (2008). 
 140 See Internal Revenue Service, Instrumentalities—Lessening the Burdens of 
Government, 1984 EO CPE Text (1984). 
 141 H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1939) (Congressional report explaining the 
government’s relief from financial burden as one basis for exempting charitable 
organizations from taxation). 
 142 No provision in the Internal Revenue Code imposes the federal income tax on 
government entities. See I.R.C. § 170 (c)(1) (allowing for deductibility of charitable 
contributions to political subdivisions of the United States and its states and possessions). 
 143 See Luger, supra note 9. 
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First, the IRS has ruled that, to lessen governmental 
burdens, an organization must demonstrate that (1) a 
governmental unit considers the organization’s activities to be 
the government’s burden, and (2) the organization’s activities 
actually lessen the burden of government.144 In evaluating 
whether an organization meets this two-part test, the IRS 
considers multiple factors, most of which center around whether 
the activities the organization plans to engage in are those the 
government actually performed or planned to perform, and the 
degree of control the government will exercise over the 
organization’s performance of those activities.145 In short, the 
more control a governmental unit exerts over an organization 
(for example, through seats on its board of directors, funding 
agreements, and annual reporting requirements) and the 
stronger the evidence that the organization’s specific activities 
replace activities that the governmental unit would otherwise 
have to perform (rather than activities it simply endorses or 
supports), the more likely the organization will be seen to be 
lessening the government’s burdens.146 
Tax law of precedential weight is virtually non-existent 
on the question of when place-based economic development 
actually lessens the burdens of government. A review of non-
precedential IRS letter rulings and memos, however, indicates 
that once an economic development organization has met the 
two-part test described in the previous paragraph, a very broad 
range of activities qualify as charitable. Examples include: 
using public bond proceeds to acquire and develop property 
that will be sold or leased to for-profit corporations to aid in 
their creation and expansion,147 forming an innovation 
incubation center for commercial tenants to lure high 
technology companies to a state,148 acquiring and leasing an 
office building to attract international trade business,149 and 
even owning a Major League baseball team to keep it from 
leaving town.150 Although most of these cases involved 
 
 144 Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985-1 C.B. 178 (1985). 
 145 Robert Louthian & Amy Henchey, Lessening the Burdens of Government, 
1993 EO CPE Text (1993) (listing some of the factors as interrelationship with 
governmental unit, activity previously conducted by governmental unit, payment of 
government expenses, sources of funding, and whether activity is one that could be 
performed directly by governmental unit). 
 146 Id. 
 147 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,852 (June 19, 1991). 
 148 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 149 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-46-032 (Nov. 13, 1992). 
 150 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). 
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organizations serving economically distressed areas, none of 
the rulings were predicated solely on this finding.151 
A second conceptual limitation is the private benefit 
doctrine. The IRC Regulation that applies the private benefit 
doctrine to all 501(c)(3) organizations makes no distinction for 
charities that lessen governmental burdens.152 The very limited 
case law on point backs up the applicability of the doctrine to 
these organizations.153 In the most relevant case, a U.S. Tax 
Court noted that an organization that claimed to lessen 
governmental burdens by conducting a certification program 
for structural steel fabricators also lessened the burden of 
business owners and developers in an equivalent amount, and 
the organization had not demonstrated that this benefit was 
incidental to the public benefit achieved.154 Thus, the private 
benefit doctrine trumped the organization’s claim that it 
lessened the burdens of government. 
One relatively early IRS general counsel memorandum 
took a similar approach in evaluating an economic development 
organization. Although finding on other grounds that the 
organization did not meet the test of lessening governmental 
burdens, the IRS noted that, even if it had, the organization 
would have had to have been evaluated on whether it “serve[d] 
public, rather than private, purposes.”155 In passing, the IRS 
noted that the organization’s proposed construction of office space 
and facilities to lure businesses to the city that it promoted left 
considerable doubt that it primarily served public interests even 
where the goal was to increase local employment.156 
This memorandum stands in contrast to the approach the 
IRS usually takes (especially more recently), which is to almost 
entirely ignore the private benefit doctrine when charities 
engage in economic development under the guise of 
governmental function. In one private letter ruling, the IRS 
conceded that below-market rates would be given by a 501(c)(3) 
organization to start-up business tenants but spent virtually no 
time measuring the public benefit that would result or the 
 
 151 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
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segment of the public that would benefit; it stated simply that 
the project is “expected to provide significant employment in an 
underutilized area.”157 In another ruling, addressing a 
community foundation’s purchase of the Kansas City Royals, the 
IRS noted that “the [f]oundation’s investment would flow 
through to private parties involved in the [t]eam’s operation” 
(including the players—most of whom received multi-million 
dollar salaries), but simply dismissed these benefits as 
“qualitatively and quantitatively incidental to the charitable 
purpose of lessening the burdens of government” without any 
further analysis.158 In short, the most relevant on-point IRS 
rulings barely mention the private benefit doctrine or do not 
consider it at all.159 
C. Additional Regulatory Standards Pertaining to 
Charitable Economic Development 
Although not technically applicable to most 501(c)(3) 
organizations, another source of standards pertinent to 
understanding what constitutes charitable economic development 
can be found in the IRC Regulations that govern program-related 
investment by 501(c)(3) private foundations (PRI Regulations).160 
The PRI Regulations reflect the IRS position on when investments 
by foundations in for-profit companies and other non-exempt 
entities for economic development purposes are charitable and are 
of greater authoritative weight than Revenue Rulings. Ultimately, 
however, the PRI Regulations in this area simply confirm the 
continued relevance of the 1970s-era Revenue Rulings, as the fact 
patterns contained in these regulations largely mirror the analysis 
and conclusions contained in those Rulings.161 
 
 157 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 158 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). 
 159 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
95-30-024 (July 28, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-46-032 (Nov. 13, 1992); I.R.S. Gen. 
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 160 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (2013). 
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Reg. § 53.4944-3(b), 77 Fed. Reg. 23429, 23430-32 (Apr. 19, 2012). 
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IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STATUS QUO 
The current jurisprudence relating to charitable 
economic development, as summarized in Part III, and the 
IRS’s current oversight of organizations involved in this type of 
work are inadequate for effectively regulating a newer breed of 
economic development charities exemplified by REDOs. 
Charitable economic development in any form presents a 
regulatory challenge for the IRS because the direct recipients of 
aid are for-profit enterprises. For-profit companies seek 
primarily to create wealth for their owners who are usually not 
members of a charitable class. Accordingly, public benefit 
occurs only as an indirect result of the success of the 
intermediary for-profit enterprises which are organized and 
obligated to prioritize the private benefit of their owners over 
the achievement of any public good. 
Moreover, in contrast to other charitable “instrumentality” 
cases (for example, the legal interns that received grants from a 
charity to represent low income individuals), the accomplishment 
of a charitable end as a result of this type of an intermediary’s 
acts is less immediate and even uncertain. A loan to a start-up 
business may allow it to purchase equipment or rent office 
space or pay for technical expertise vital to its reaching the 
next stage of development. But the payoff to a distressed 
community as a result of the loan in terms of new jobs, 
additional tax revenue, or other measurable impact may be 
years away or may never come at all.162 Aid to the community 
trickles down slowly if at all; the only certain beneficiaries are 
the for-profit companies.163 
These problems are only heightened as charitable 
economic development is increasingly carried out by organizations 
with a broader regional focus. As REDOs aid businesses in areas 
that are geographically larger and socioeconomically more 
diverse, determining whether, when, and how those who are 
worthy targets of charitable aid actually benefit becomes all the 
more difficult. Standing as it does in sharp contrast to more 
conventional charitable activity (which is typically provided 
directly and immediately to members of a charitable class), 
“charitable” economic development would seem to merit careful 
 
 162 See generally Bartik, supra note 9; see also Norman Krumholz, Equitable 
Approaches to Local Economic Development, 27 POL’Y STUDIES J. 83 (1999). 
 163 Krumholz, supra note 162 at 85. 
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additional attention from the IRS. But this is not reflected in the 
current jurisprudence or IRS practices.164 
This article proposes that the problem with the current 
system has three components—(1) the current jurisprudential 
analytic standards for evaluating whether an economic 
development organization is charitable are too outdated and 
blunt to adequately assess contemporary organizations, (2) 
there is inconsistency in how rigorously even these inadequate 
standards are applied, and (3) the IRS has no adequate 
mechanism for monitoring whether an economic development 
organization accomplishes charitable ends after it is initially 
recognized as a 501(c)(3) charity. As a result, there is 
significant potential for organizations to benefit from the 
substantial tax breaks, access to funding, and societal goodwill 
associated with 501(c)(3) status, even though the ends 
accomplished by their work are not really charitable. I discuss 
the basis for these three concerns and the resulting harm in 
greater detail here in Part IV before moving on to possible 
solutions, further considerations, and recommendations in the 
sections that follow. My principal contention is that a more 
nuanced, consistent, and frequent application of the private 
benefit doctrine to all organizations engaged in charitable 
economic development can address all three concerns. 
A. Outdated and Blunt Analytic Standards 
The principal task of the IRS in applying the private benefit 
test to charitable economic development is to decipher whether, in 
a particular set of circumstances, the aid to businesses that an 
organization provides results primarily in the accomplishment of 
charitable or commercial objectives. Put into private benefit 
terminology, is the benefit resulting from the assistance rendered 
to the for-profit instrumentalities in fact both insubstantial relative 
to the benefit ultimately experienced by a charitable class, and 
necessary for achievement of that public benefit?165 Or is it the 
other way around—is the charitable class merely the incidental 
beneficiary of the services rendered to the instrumentalities? 
These questions are easier to ask than to answer. There 
is no fixed percentage for what constitutes insubstantiality; no 
uniform mechanism for quantifying benefits (some of which are 
monetary and some of which are not); “necessity” can be largely 
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subjective; and even the question of when some benefits should 
be considered public and when they are private is debatable. 
The precedential jurisprudence arising from the 1970s-era 
Revenue Rulings fills the gaps only to an extent (and only as to 
the more common form of place-based charitable economic 
development organizations—those purporting to aid the poor and 
distressed). As explained in Part III, these Rulings consider, to 
varying degrees: (1) whether the area the charity serves is 
distressed, (2) the needs of the businesses it serves, and (3) the 
nexus between the benefits aid to those businesses will yield and 
the alleviation of the area’s distress.166 Within this loose 
framework, the IRS develops its hunch on whether the 
organization primarily serves commercial or charitable purposes. 
This framework worked well enough in assessing the 
more obviously charitable forms of economic development 
conducted in the 1970s by CDCs in highly distressed 
neighborhoods.167 But it is too imprecise for the economic 
development of the twenty-first century, like that conducted by 
REDOs. To demonstrate this, consider the example of the 
Business Accelerator, profiled in Part I. The organization’s 
ultimate objective is revitalization of an economically depressed 
region. It seeks to accomplish this by investing seed capital in 
and providing technical assistance to the region’s companies 
with the highest potential. Aside from realizing a return on its 
investment to satisfy stockholders, the Business Accelerator 
operates like a private sector venture capital firm.168 
The first consideration from the Rulings is whether the 
area the organization serves is “distressed.” But what 
constitutes “distress”? There is no established definition for 
501(c)(3) purposes. Furthermore, how much of an area must be 
distressed in order to qualify it as an appropriate target of 
charitable economic development? The economically depressed 
anchor city served by the Business Accelerator will likely 
satisfy most definitions of distressed. But what about the 
surrounding 15-county region? The nature of urban sprawl in 
present day America is that proximate to most distressed 
 
 166 Supra Part III. 
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urban cores is a mix of enclaves of significant wealth, and areas 
that are largely upper middle and/or middle-class.169 
The broad geographic and socioeconomic coverage of 
REDOs begs the question of how much of the organization’s 
services must go toward companies in the region’s highly 
distressed areas. REDOs like the Business Accelerator often 
make their investments in businesses and individuals located 
in the more affluent sections of the regions they serve.170 As a 
practical matter, this makes sense given that those with the 
means and educational background to cultivate high-growth 
businesses are more likely to be found in areas of affluence 
than in those that are poverty-stricken.171 But is location 
proximate to an area of severe distress enough to make a 
business an appropriate target for charitable aid and, if so, how 
close must it be? What is the appropriate mix of wealth and 
poverty within a large region in order for businesses throughout 
it to be considered appropriate targets of charitable aid? The 
current jurisprudence, which is based on IRS rulings analyzing 
organizations serving highly impoverished urban neighborhoods, 
does not consider areas with mixed demographics. 
The second jurisprudential consideration is also difficult to 
evaluate. Is it “necessary” that the Business Accelerator provide 
the companies it serves with financing and technical services in 
the sense that the companies would not otherwise have access to 
them? With an eye toward regional transformation, organizations 
like the Business Accelerator often target new economy 
companies with perceived high-growth potential, like 
biotechnology, software, engineering, and medical research 
enterprises pursuing cutting-edge technologies.172 Undoubtedly, 
these enterprises are much better situated to attract private 
sector financing than the minority-owned businesses described in 
 
 169 See VEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 20-26 (describing how broad economic 
trends, locational preferences of individuals, and state policies have facilitated the 
migration of people, jobs, and resources toward expanding metropolitan fringes, while 
reinforcing the concentration of poverty and deterioration of urban cores). 
 170 See, e.g., JUMPSTART, http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus/pressroom/
pressreleases.aspx, (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (review of JumpStart’s press releases 
from July 2011 to June 2012 shows it made 11 investments of $250,000 apiece—2 of 
the companies invested in were located in Cleveland and Akron which have high 
poverty rates while remaining 9 companies were located in suburban areas). 
 171 Edward L. Glaeser et al., Consumer City, 1 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 27 (2001) 
(finding that high human capital workers are attracted to areas with amenities and 
high quality of life). 
 172 See, e.g., websites of REDOs identified supra note 11 for portfolios of 
companies they assist; see also e.g., IDEA FOUNDRY, http://ideafoundry.org/portfolio (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2014); HOUSTON TECH. CENTER, http://www.houstontech.org/about-
houston-technology-center/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
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Revenue Ruling 74-587 that were located in highly distressed 
neighborhoods and red-lined by local banks. 
The third consideration raises even thornier questions: 
What is the nexus between the assistance the Business 
Accelerator provides to its business clients and addressing the 
needs of those in the community who are distressed? The 1970s-
era Revenue Rulings distinguished between organizations 
supporting business activity in any form from those that 
targeted businesses that promised to hire low income or low 
skilled workers, or targeted entrepreneurs who were themselves 
low income or otherwise distressed.173 Again, the businesses 
targeted by organizations like the Business Accelerator are often 
more sophisticated and seeking to commercialize a technology or 
scientific discovery.174 Their founders and leadership teams 
consist of highly educated, highly skilled individuals whose 
prospects for employment elsewhere are almost certainly quite 
good. The short-term hiring needs of companies in these 
industries typically involve other highly educated, highly skilled 
individuals like researchers, engineers, programmers, and those 
with CEO/CFO experience.175 Provided one of these companies 
ultimately proves successful and becomes fully operational, its 
hiring needs may change to include manufacturing, office staff, 
and sales positions, but the number of jobs like this that might 
be created can be quite speculative and even the success of 
these businesses is difficult to predict. Moreover, early-stage, 
knowledge-based companies are susceptible to being lured to 
other regions when subsequent funding, a buyer, or new 
leadership emerges elsewhere.176 Is there really a close link 
between the types of companies that an organization like the 
Business Accelerator invests in and the needs of an economically 
distressed region’s unemployed and poor residents? 
Given these difficulties, how does the IRS evaluate 
twenty-first-century economic development? Put simply, the 
IRS tells its agents who review applications for recognition of 
 
 173 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-111. 
 174 See, e.g., supra note 170. 
 175 See, e.g., JUMPSTART JOB BOARD, http://jumpstartincc.force.com/careers 
(displaying current open positions at Jumpstart portfolio companies) (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2013). 
 176 Chuck Soder, Startups with Ties to Other Areas May Not Grow in Ohio, 
CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (May 21, 2012), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/
20120521/SUB1/305219980/1053/toc&Profile=1053. 
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501(c)(3) status to use their intuition.177 The agents are 
instructed to follow a “facts and circumstances” approach and 
exercise their judgment in determining whether “the ultimate 
good received by the general public outweighs the private 
benefit accorded to the direct beneficiaries.”178 But the IRS 
provides no clear markers or methodology. This has historically 
been the policy of the IRS when it comes to most organizations 
that raise private benefit issues.179 This approach has come 
under sharp criticism from commentators and scholars, who 
have characterized the IRS’s application of the private benefit 
doctrine as “pliant,”180 inconsistent and inefficient,181 and 
subject to the agency’s enforcement policy whims.182 
The end result is that charities engaged in economic 
development do not appear to receive careful or consistent 
consideration under the private benefit doctrine, which is the 
very issue on which their 501(c)(3) status ought to turn. 
REDOs that invest publicly subsidized money directly into high 
growth potential businesses across broad and demographically 
diverse geographic areas are proliferating.183 Yet how are they 
surviving IRS review under the 1970s era Revenue Rulings if, 
as the discussion above of the Business Accelerator reveals, 
these organizations are aiding businesses that aren’t 
necessarily distressed, in areas of the country that aren’t 
necessarily poor and are creating jobs that don’t necessarily go 
to the unemployed? A review of two IRS Private Letter Rulings 
from the past decade reveals how the current approach to 
evaluating economic development can lead to significantly 
divergent outcomes. In one case, the IRS found that an 
organization that offered start-up businesses below market 
rates at its incubator and innovation center was achieving 
charitable purposes simply because it was “stimulating the 
economy” across an entire state by aiding the growth of high-
technology businesses and did so without even a mention of the 
private benefit doctrine.184 In another case, the IRS rejected the 
 
 177 See Robert Louthian & Marvin Friedlander, Economic Development 
Corporations: Charity Through the Back Door (1992 EO CPE Text), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicg92.pdf. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Megosh et al., Private Benefit Under IRC 501(c)(3) (2001 EO CPE Text), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.pdf. 
 180 HOPKINS, supra note19, at 20.11(b). 
 181 Jones, supra note 87, at 1005-06. 
 182 Colombo, supra note 86, at 1079. 
 183 See supra notes 11, 15.  
 184 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
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claim for charitable status of an organization assisting 
merchants to promote their businesses in an area of a 
community designated by the government as “distressed” 
because “that assistance is not limited to businesses 
experiencing difficulty” and includes some businesses that are 
“making money and are viable” and based its conclusion 
squarely on the private benefit doctrine.185 
It is difficult to extrapolate a consistent principle from 
the current landscape. Based on the facts in recent IRS Private 
Letter Rulings, one might conclude that the IRS prefers 
organizations that provide businesses with capital infusions 
and incubator space over those that offer advertising and 
marketing assistance, and prefers aid to start-up and 
technology companies over aid to merchants.186 But these 
distinctions seem arbitrary if the purpose of the private benefit 
doctrine in this context is to clarify those scenarios in which aid 
to private businesses primarily benefits the businesses and 
their owners and those in which this aid primarily benefits the 
community the organization aspires to serve. What does seem 
clear is the need for more meaningful, consistent, and up-to-
date standards applying the private benefit doctrine to 
charitable economic development. 
B. Inconsistent Application of Analytic Standards 
In addressing the shortcomings of the current standards 
above, I singled out IRS treatment of economic development 
organizations that base their claim to charitable status on 
providing aid to the distressed. As Part III explained, another 
category of 501(c)(3) economic development organizations rely 
also or, in some cases, exclusively on the claim that they are 
“lessening the burdens of government.”187 In theory, a 501(c)(3) 
organization must satisfy the private benefit doctrine irrespective 
of which phrase it relies upon. In reality, however, the IRS applies 
the private benefit doctrine even less carefully and consistently to 
organizations that “lessen governmental burdens” than it does to 
organizations “seeking to aid the distressed.” 
Recall the example of the Regional Advocate, another one 
of the modern day REDOs profiled in Part I. This organization’s 
 
 185 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200447048 (Nov. 19, 2004). 
 186 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201135032 (Sept. 2, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006 14030 (Apr. 7, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 200447048 (Nov. 19, 2004). 
 187 Supra Part III.B. 
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primary objective is the creation of high-quality, high-wage jobs 
in an already up-and-coming region. Its activities consist of 
assembling relocation packages to get companies to move to the 
region, pursuing marketing initiatives touting the region and its 
businesses, and spearheading legislative agendas to create an 
environment that is even more business friendly. The Regional 
Advocate has elected public officials on its board of directors, 
gets one half of its funding from public sources, and engages in 
the types of marketing and business-attraction activities that 
state and local governments around the country are increasingly 
undertaking. Thus, it can legitimately claim that it lessens 
governmental burdens. 
But how does an organization like this satisfy the private 
benefit doctrine? The geographic area it serves is prosperous. 
Every aspect of its programming involves providing direct support 
to individual businesses and/or the business community in 
general, but without any mention of distress or need encountered 
by those businesses. Moreover, its programs are focused more on 
attracting businesses from elsewhere than creating new 
businesses from within. An organization like the Regional 
Advocate would likely assert that it serves public interests by 
relieving municipal governments in the region of the costs 
associated with engaging in their own individual economic 
initiatives and aiding its growing population by making high 
wage jobs available. But how do these “public” benefits measure 
up against the substantial amount of financial, marketing, and 
legislative assistance that the organization provides to already 
functional businesses? What about the countervailing interests of 
other regions (quite possibly distressed regions in other parts of 
the country or world) whose companies and jobs are being lured 
away by the organization? Did the crafters of the Tax Code really 
intend to incentivize job poaching through the charitable subsidy? 
As explained in Part III, the answer is that the IRS 
typically expends very little, if any, effort applying the private 
benefit doctrine to organizations like the Regional Advocate. A 
review of IRS private letter rulings and General Counsel 
memoranda evaluating economic development organizations 
that claim to lessen governmental burdens backs up this 
contention.188 Moreover, the IRS has explicitly chided itself for 
 
 188 See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 9530024, 1995 WL 45044 (July 28, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9246032 (Nov. 
13, 1992); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,852 (July 1, 1991); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
38,693 (Apr. 15, 1981).  
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not scrutinizing private benefit implications closely enough 
when organizations claim to lessen the burdens of government. 
Training materials for its own agents state that  
often neglected in lessening the burdens cases is a consideration of 
the private interests served by the organization’s activities; 
irrespective of whether an organization’s activities lessen the 
burdens of government, the organization must still demonstrate that 
its activities serve a public rather than a private interest within the 
meaning of Reg 1.501(c)(3)–(d)(1).189 
Published IRS rulings subsequent to this self-reprimand 
give no indication that IRS agents have followed this 
directive.190 It is hard to blame the agents, however. If the 
private benefit standards that apply to economic development 
organizations that “aid the distressed” can be described as 
rudimentary, those that apply to organizations that “lessen the 
burdens of government” are virtually nonexistent. There is no 
equivalent in these cases to the 1970s-era Revenue Rulings. 
When the private benefit doctrine is mentioned at all in lessening 
the burdens of government cases, the letter rulings make only 
vague references to ensuring that public benefit predominates 
over private benefit with little hint of how to measure one relative 
to the other. In its training materials, the IRS does no more than 
direct its agents to cases in which other agents engaged in an 
intuitive balancing of public and private benefit.191 The IRS lacks 
a consistent (or perhaps any) approach for evaluating REDOs 
that claim to lessen governmental burdens on an issue that 
should be critical to their 501(c)(3) eligibility. 
C. Inadequate Mechanisms for Ensuring Ongoing 
Compliance 
IRS scrutiny of 501(c)(3) organizations is heavily front-
loaded. Most organizations that seek 501(c)(3) status must 
submit an application on Form 1023 to the IRS which will be 
reviewed by one of the agency’s exempt organizations 
 
 189 Louthian & Henchey, supra note 145, 1993 EO CPE Text (1993), 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb93.pdf. 
 190 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005) (reasoning that a 
foundation serves public interest because of its charitable purposes, with minimal 
discussion of the private benefit doctrine); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9530024 (July 28, 1995) 
(concluding private benefit is incidental to the purpose of lessening the burden of 
government although it overlooked the pertinent principles of the private benefit doctrine). 
 191 Louthian & Henchey, supra note 145, at 1993 EO CPE Text, 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb93.pdf; Andrew Mergosh, Lary Scollick, Mary Jo 
Salins and Chevy Chasin, Private Benefit Under 501(c)(3), 2001 EO CPE Text (2001). 
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specialists to determine if the organization will operate within 
the limits of Section 501(c)(3).192 One of the questions on the 
application is specifically directed at organizations that will 
engage in economic development and asks the applicant to 
explain who will benefit from these types of activities and how 
they will further charitable purposes.193 However, organizations 
typically apply for 501(c)(3) status before they begin to operate 
or at a nascent stage and, therefore, their responses related to 
program services are often prospective.194 As a result, to the 
extent the IRS questions a REDO on how it will satisfy private 
benefit concerns, the organization’s responses are based on 
what it thinks its activities will be and what it hopes these 
activities will accomplish. 
If the IRS issues a determination letter to the 
organization recognizing its exempt status, the organization 
can rely on this indefinitely.195 There is no formal mechanism 
by which the organization must periodically reestablish the 
basis for its exempt status. Thus, most organizations are 
granted tax-exempt status on the basis of largely aspirational 
and non-specific projections about their programming and 
never again separately questioned about it. 
It is true that most 501(c)(3) organizations must also 
submit annual information returns to the IRS. The return 
contains financial and factual information related to the 
operations of the organization.196 This document is used by 
government officials, prospective contributors, the media, and 
others to evaluate the overall finances, operations, and merits 
of an exempt organization.197 However, although the IRS may 
use information contained in an organization’s Form 990 as the 
basis for investigating the organization, Form 990 is 
principally a public disclosure document. Due to limited 
staffing, the IRS Tax Exempt Division typically reviews less 
than two percent of the 990s it receives198 and audits returns at 
a rate of one-third of one percent.199 
 
 192 I.R.C. § 508(a) (2006). 
 193 I.R.S. Form 1023, Part VIII, questions 6a and 6b. 
 194 See I.R.S. Publication 557 (2013). Because most organizations must receive 
a determination letter before they can take advantage of the tax and funding benefits 
associated with 501(c)(3) status, organizations typically apply soon after incorporating. 
 195 See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 806-07. 
 196 I.R.S. Form 990 (2013). 
 197 HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 810. 
 198 See Fishman, supra note 20, at 581.  
 199 Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 
FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2011). 
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Moreover, although the Form 990 requests detailed 
information on certain aspects of an organization’s operations 
that are particularly likely to raise hot button legal compliance 
issues—such as executive compensation, transactions with 
organizational insiders, and lobbying activities—the Form 
requires little detail on the foundational issues of how an 
organization conducts its programs and who specifically it 
serves.200 The Form asks only one direct question about an 
organization’s program services during the previous year.201 In 
answering this question, organizations are directed by the IRS 
Form 990 instructions to briefly describe the programs and 
provide specific measurements of its accomplishments, like the 
number of “clients served” and “sessions or events held.”202 But 
no more is required in terms of factual details. In fact, most 
organizations are fairly strategic in how they respond to this 
question, recognizing that their Form 990 is open to public 
inspection.203 Many respond simply with a sentence or two 
description of each program service.204 From a 501(c)(3) 
engaged in economic development, the Form requires no 
information regarding the specific companies served by this 
type of organization, how the assistance the organization 
provided aided those in the region served who needed 
assistance, and/or how the assistance received by the 
businesses served was incidental to (that is, insubstantial 
relative to and necessary for) the achievement of public benefit. 
The end result is that the IRS’s only significant 
investigation of the link between who benefits from an 
organization’s activities and its proclaimed exempt purposes is 
usually completed when the organization initially files an 
application for 501(c)(3) status. For the many 501(c)(3) 
organizations engaged in conventional charitable activities that 
involve the direct and immediate provision of aid to members of 
an obvious charitable class, this method of regulation is not 
problematic and is sensitive to IRS resource limitations. But it is 
not effective for monitoring economic development organizations.  
It is easy for organizations to project the anticipated 
public benefit that will result from investments in private 
 
 200 I.R.S. Form 990, Part VII (2013). 
 201 I.R.S. Form 990, Part III, question 4. 
 202 I.R.S., Instructions for Form 990 Return of Org. Exempt from Income Tax 
(Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf. 
 203 I.R.S. Form 990 (in top right corner, the form states “Open to Public Inspection”). 
 204 See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECON. COUNCIL (I.R.S. Form 990 at 2) (2010) 
(answering question 4 with only two sentences). 
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businesses, but much harder to ensure that these projections 
come to fruition. Public sector programs that aid private 
businesses often demand accountability for the tax breaks and 
publicly financed loans they provide, sometimes even requiring 
that businesses return a portion of the aid they receive if 
results don’t meet the initial projections.205 The IRS, on the 
other hand, has no mechanism for evaluating whether 
charitable economic development organizations come close to 
appropriately balancing the achievement of public and private 
benefit once they become operational. In other words, there is 
no long-term accountability with respect to the very issue that 
makes economic development organizations a regulatory 
challenge and worthy of special attention. 
D. The Harm in the Status Quo 
My critique up until this point has focused on arguing 
how the IRS’s current approach fails to adequately evaluate 
which nonprofit organizations engaged in economic development 
satisfy private benefit concerns and, thus, are really charitable. 
It is fair at this point to ask the question, “So what?” After all, 
the other 28 subchapters of Section 501(c) allow a broad range of 
nonprofit organizations other than charities to qualify for 
exemption from income tax.206 Almost all REDOs could achieve 
tax exemption under Section 501(c)(4) as organizations that 
operate “for the promotion of social welfare” by satisfying far less 
exacting standards than apply under Section 501(c)(3).207 Thus, 
what is the real harm associated with the IRS’s current lack of 
precision and rigor in scrutinizing those seeking to be economic 
development charities? 
While multifaceted, the “harm” is linked to the 
consequences of an IRS determination that an organization 
qualifies as a 501(c)(3), as opposed to another type of tax-exempt 
entity. The law at all levels uniquely privileges nonprofit 
organizations engaged in charitable work.208 While commentators 
 
 205 Steve Lerch, Economic Development Accountability Laws, WASH. ST. INST. 
FOR PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2004) (summarizing different types of economic development 
accountability legislation city and state governments have passed to ensure that 
incentives provided to businesses meet desired economic development goals). 
 206 I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012). 
 207 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012). 
 208 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW 
OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 155-58 (2005) (describing tax and non-tax benefits at federal, state, 
and local levels associated with 501(c)(3) status). 
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have offered multiple theories for why that is, an overlapping 
theme is that charities undertake tasks widely accepted as 
meritorious and beneficial to society, but which the private 
sector and/or the government are unable or unwilling to 
perform.209 Accordingly, our society at large chooses to subsidize 
and incentive the performance of charitable work through laws 
that provide tax incentives, regulatory exemptions, and myriad 
other privileges unique to 501(c)(3)s that, when taken together, 
amount to a sizeable subsidy.210 The IRS, through its authority 
to determine which organizations qualify under Section 
501(c)(3), unlocks the door to these privileges and, thus, bears 
the responsibility of safeguarding America’s charitable 
subsidy.211 Imprecision in carrying out this responsibility leads 
to misuse of the subsidy. 
This misuse manifests in several different ways. A 
straightforward and significant example is in the tax deduction 
that Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides to 
individual and corporate taxpayers who make contributions to 
501(c)(3) organizations.212 Subject to certain limitations, the 
deduction allows donors to deduct the value of their contributions 
from their taxable income.213 The estimated five-year cost of this 
deduction is $246.1 billion.214 This cost is borne by all U.S. 
taxpayers because tax dollars foregone through the deduction 
must be offset by other tax revenue. The greater the imprecision 
in determining 501(c)(3) eligibility, the larger the portion of this 
taxpayer-financed subsidy that is being misspent on and 
incentivizing activity that is not really charitable. 
The same point can be made with respect to the other 
exemptions and privileges that federal law ties to 501(c)(3) 
status, including (to name just a few) exemption from federal 
unemployment taxes, the eligibility to issue tax-exempt bonds, 
 
 209 See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 297-313 (4th ed. 2010) (summarizing the major theories which explain 
the rationale for charitable tax advantages); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the 
exempt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the community may 
not itself choose or be able to provide . . . .”). 
 210 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591 (“When the Government grants exemptions or 
allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for 
the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’”). 
 211 Id. at 596-97. 
 212 See I.R.C. § 170 (2006). 
 213 Id. 
 214 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014 45-48 (2010). 
2014] TRICKLE DOWN CHARITY 1499 
and preferred postal rates.215 It also applies to the ripple effect 
that an organization’s 501(c)(3) status has at the state and 
local levels: exemption from state and municipal income tax in 
many jurisdictions is tied to 501(c)(3) status, as is eligibility for 
many types of grants and contracts and, as at the federal level, 
a wide array of other exceptions, exemptions, and privileges.216 
Moreover, this imprecision has resulted to some degree 
in the over-recognition of economic development organizations 
under Section 501(c)(3) and, thus, overspends the charitable 
subsidy. This is clearly the case for organizations that claim to 
lessen governmental burdens, as the IRS has failed to utilize 
the private benefit doctrine to filter out otherwise qualifying 
organizations. It is probably also true for organizations that 
claim to aid the distressed, as evidenced by the recent 
proliferation of REDOs serving large geographic areas that are 
often not predominantly distressed.217  
The consequences of misuse, however, go beyond simply 
misdirecting and/or over-spending the charitable subsidy. In 
some cases, the availability of a particular component of the 
charitable subsidy is limited and, thus, its support of non-
charitable activities comes at the expense of support for 
activities that are charitable. One example of this is grant-
making by charitable foundations, which is a substantial and 
increasing source of support for economic development 
organizations.218 In the aggregate, around 14% of all 
contributions (approximately $41 billion) to 501(c)(3) 
organizations come from private foundations which are obligated 
to expend their funds in support of charitable purposes.219 
Because most foundation trustees view preservation of the 
foundation’s assets for future use as a part of their “duty of 
care,” most foundations limit their annual grant-making and 
other payouts to five percent of their assets, the minimum 
payout required by the Internal Revenue Code for charitable 
 
 215 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 208, at 155-58. 
 216 Id. 
 217 See supra notes 11, 15 and accompanying text. 
 218 See, e.g., THE FOUND. CTR., supra note 13 (showing a 152% increase in 
economic development grantmaking between 2005 and 2011, and also showing that, as 
a share of total giving in Ohio, economic development grants doubled, from 7% to 14% 
between 2005 and 2008). 
 219 GIVING USA FOUND., GIVING USA 2011 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE ANNUAL 
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2010 4 (2011) (showing private foundations 
contributed about $41 billion to 501(c)(3) organizations in 2010, which accounted for 
14% of all contributions); AM. CITY BUREAU, INC., OVERVIEW OF GIVING USA 2009 KEY 
FINDINGS (2009) (showing private foundations contributed about $41 billion to 501(c)(3) 
organizations in 2008, which accounted for about 13% of all contributions).  
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foundations.220 Accordingly, the pool of foundation grants 
available annually to 501(c)(3) organizations is limited and 
grants that are made in support of non-charitable activities 
necessarily decrease the amounts available for charitable 
activities. In real terms, grants supporting REDOs that invest in 
businesses may come at the expense of grants available for more 
conventional charitable organizations like food banks, community 
health centers, and afterschool arts programs.221 This is not a 
problem if REDOs are properly scrutinized for 501(c)(3) 
qualification, but it opens the door for a significant diversion of 
funding intended for charitable purposes if they are not. 
This diversion may negatively impact not only charities, 
but for-profit businesses as well. Access to capital and the costs 
associated with technical assistance and basic infrastructure 
present huge challenges for most startup companies. 
Organizations like REDOs utilize the charitable subsidy to help 
certain companies overcome these challenges by providing 
financing, office space, other forms of expertise, and 
infrastructure below cost or, in some cases, at no cost. 
Undoubtedly, this gives the businesses that are assisted a huge 
leg up over competing firms. Again, if REDOs are properly 
scrutinized to ensure a strong nexus between the businesses 
they aid and the accomplishment of charitable purposes, this 
leg up should be fully consistent with the purpose of subsidizing 
charitable organizations. But if the activities of the organization 
are not rigorously reviewed, businesses whose success bears little 
connection to the accomplishment of charitable purposes will 
benefit unjustifiably relative to all other businesses (not only 
those whose success would accomplish charitable purposes, but 
also those which simply face existing barriers to entering the 
marketplace without taxpayer funded assistance). 
In summary, the chief function of the IRS as it relates to 
the charitable sector is to monitor who qualifies for 501(c)(3) status 
to assure the public and donors that the charitable subsidy is 
 
 220 COMMONFUND INST., PRINCIPLES OF NONPROFIT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
11 (2005), available at https://www.commonfund.org/_catalogs/masterpage/
principlesofnonprofitinvestmgmt.pdf; AKASH DEEP & PETER FUMPKIN, THE FOUNDATION 
PAYOUT PUZZLE 11 (2001), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/PDF_
XLS/workingpapers/workingpaper_9.pdf. 
 221 Compare FOUND. CTR., supra note 13, with FOUND. CTR., SPOTLIGHT ON 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GRANTMAKING IN OHIO (Feb. 2008), http://foundcenter.org/
gainknowledge/research/pdf/spotlight_ohio_2008.pdf (showing that the increase in 
economic development grantmaking as a share of total giving in Ohio between 2005 
and 2008 resulted in a corresponding decrease in the percentage of grant dollars used 
for other purposes).  
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utilized for legitimate charitable purposes as the law has defined 
them. Where the potential for significant misuse of this subsidy 
exists, the IRS, Congress, or the courts must step in to address it. 
V. CRAFTING A SOLUTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE 
REGULATION OF CHARITABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Merits of a Well-Tailored Private Benefit Doctrine 
This article’s principal contention is that a more 
nuanced, consistent, and frequent application of the private 
benefit doctrine to organizations engaged in charitable economic 
development can help resolve all three of the concerns raised in 
the previous section and better protect the charitable subsidy. 
Calling upon the private benefit doctrine to add clarity to the 
regulation of any category of 501(c)(3) organizations might at 
first seem like a questionable proposition. The language serving 
as the basis for the doctrine is awkwardly written and lacks 
well-established theoretical boundaries to guide its 
application.222 The IRS Exempt Organizations Division—the 
very department charged with enforcing the doctrine—concedes 
that it can be difficult to apply as “decided cases provide only 
broad bench-marks, with the result that the relevant facts in 
each individual case must be strained through those 
[established] principles to arrive at a decision on the particular 
case.”223 Commentators and scholars have frequently battered 
the doctrine and its application by the IRS,224 with some arguing 
that it should be reined in or even abandoned altogether.225 
Rather than throwing the private benefit doctrine under 
the bus, however, it is worth noting that no one who criticizes 
the doctrine really finds fault with the general premise that in 
order for an organization to merit the charitable subsidy it must 
primarily serve public interests.226 Criticism focuses instead on 
how the doctrine is applied. Some question the recent significant 
increase in the number of situations in which the IRS invokes 
the doctrine, asserting that the malleability of the doctrine 
 
 222 See Colombo, supra note 86, at 1080 (“Indeed, the problem is that the 
doctrine currently has no theoretical grounding to set its outer boundaries.”); see also 
HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 540. 
 223 Megosh et al., supra note 179, at 140 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 224 HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 540; Jones, supra note 87, at 1002-05. 
 225 See Colombo, supra note 86, at 1065 (“In the past, I have expressed my 
displeasure with the private benefit doctrine in writing, explicitly calling for its demise.”). 
 226 See Jones, supra note 87, at 998; see also Colombo, supra note 86, at 1067. 
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allows the IRS to mold it to serve as a basis to oppose every new 
interaction between a nonprofit and a private party that it does 
not like.227 Others criticize the discretion the test provides to IRS 
agents to grant or deny organizations 501(c)(3) status without 
reference to a guiding principle. In words that aptly sum up this 
point, one scholar referred to it as the “quintessential balancing 
test under which the IRS both owns and reads the scale, leaving 
charities completely at sea regarding the possible ill effects of 
transactions with for-profit intermediaries.”228 
While conceding that the above are valid criticisms, I 
contend that the private benefit doctrine, when properly 
refined and articulated, could serve as a clear and consistent 
tool for the IRS to use in evaluating newly emerging types of 
charities (like REDOs) in a vastly changing nonprofit world 
that more closely resembles the private sector. The size, 
sophistication, and scope of nonprofit organizations have 
increased significantly in the last several decades.229 A 
combination of increased responsibility caused by the 
government’s gradual withdrawal from the direct provision of 
social services, increased competition for dwindling public 
sector and philanthropic dollars, and the increased professional 
credentials of those working within the nonprofit sector has 
resulted in an industry that is on the whole more self-
sufficient, ambitious, and entrepreneurial.230 This, in turn, has 
increased the influence of the private sector on how charities 
operate. In the twenty-first century, nonprofits view fees 
charged for services as an essential source of operational 
income; create for-profit and nonprofit subsidiaries to partner 
with private sector property developers and operate business 
ventures; enter into complicated capital-raising vehicles in 
cooperation with investment banks; and transfer valuable 
rights in technology, research, and other intellectual property 
to private companies with the capacity to commercialize these 
assets and generate vast sums of profit. 231 
 
 227 See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 540 (b). 
 228 Colombo, supra note 86, at 1065. 
 229 Alan J. Abramson & Rachel McCarthy, Infrastructure Organizations, in 
THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA, 423 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). 
 230 See generally Gerry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthro-capitalism, 61 
CASE W. RES. U. L. REV. 753, 755 (2011) (describing recent pressures on nonprofit sector to 
become more like private sector in its “capacity, efficiency, accountability and effectiveness”). 
 231 See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Doing Well By Doing Good and Vice Versa; Self 
Sustaining NGO/Nonprofit Organizations, 17 J. L. & POL’Y 403, 424-33 (2009); see also 
Kelley, supra note 26, at 2438-39 (discussing how nonprofits are expected to operate 
like successful commercial enterprises). 
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These are developments the IRS probably did not 
foresee in 1959 when the language providing the basis for the 
private benefit doctrine was formally adopted into the IRC 
Regulations. And yet, this doctrine, among all of the other 
language contained in Section 501(c)(3) and the IRC 
Regulations, appears to be the most salient to the very concerns 
raised as the private sector becomes increasingly intertwined 
with the charitable domain. Its broad wording makes it 
potentially adaptable to addressing unforeseen issues in an 
ever more complex nonprofit world. 
At the same time, there reaches a point when, as it 
pertains to a particular category of 501(c)(3) organizations, the 
facts and circumstances, gut-reaction style approach that the 
IRS takes in applying the private benefit doctrine fails to 
adequately regulate. When this approach leads to differing 
results among similar organizations, does not provide adequate 
guidance on which activities fall outside the definition of 
charitable, or fails to ensure sufficient accountability, it must 
be refined so that the doctrine better addresses the unique 
issues raised by that subset of organizations. It is at this point 
that Congress, the IRS, or the courts must step in to clarify and 
sharpen the jurisprudence and/or reform the way the doctrine 
is being applied. This has happened on several occasions in the 
last decade, including for hospitals,232 private-sector joint 
ventures,233 credit counseling organizations,234 and housing 
down payment providers.235 The time has arrived for it to 
happen for economic development organizations as well. 
B. Possible Strategies 
Of course, the harder task is not acknowledging that the 
private benefit doctrine must be better tailored for economic 
development organizations, but determining how to do so. There 
are a wide range of possible strategies, most of which would 
require congressional legislation to amend Section 501 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, an amendment to Treasury Department 
regulations, an IRS Revenue Ruling, or a combination of these. 
These possibilities (none of which are mutually exclusive) include: 
 
 232 I.R.C. § 501(r) (2010). 
 233 Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998 C.B. 718 (Mar. 23, 1998). 
 234 I.R.C. § 501(q) (2010). 
 235 Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 2006-21 I.R.B. 915, 2006-I.C.B. 915. 
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1. Modernizing and Refining Jurisprudential 
Standards  
One obvious fix would be to modernize the standards set 
forth in the 1970s-era Revenue Rulings. Through a Revenue 
Ruling, the IRS could update these standards to clarify what 
constitutes a distressed area, more fully define the types and 
amounts of public benefit that must follow from aid to businesses, 
and/or more explicitly characterize the required link between the 
aid provided by organizations and the needs of the businesses 
aided. Doing so would provide aspiring 501(c)(3) organizations 
and the IRS with clearer, more relevant standards. 
Of course, the IRS would face some hard choices in 
deciding how to refine those standards. Should the standards 
be more quantitative (for example, by imposing fixed 
thresholds like the percentage of jobs created that must be 
filled by low-income people who reside within an organization’s 
service area), more qualitative (for example, by more explicitly 
defining a distressed area or an appropriate charitable class for 
economic development purposes) or a combination of the two? 
The type of economic development an area needs depends on 
the challenges it faces. Would more refined standards apply 
uniformly or would they vary relative to specific socio-economic 
challenges faced by the population served, indicators of distress, 
or some other factor? Would standards vary according to the 
activities engaged in by an organization (for example, should an 
organization face job creation thresholds that are tied specifically 
to the amount of money it invests in for-profit enterprises)? 
These questions raise the larger issues of the extent to 
which concepts like private and public benefit can even be 
accurately measured, and whether imposing more narrowly 
defined standards could actually result in excluding some 
organizations that accomplish charitable ends. Finally, how 
and to what extent would these standards apply to economic 
development organizations that seek charitable status by 
claiming to lessen the burdens of government? Would a 
separate set of standards need to exist for these organizations 
and on what basis would it be formulated? 
2. Allowing Organizations to Formulate Their Own 
Private/Public Benefit Standards  
An alternative to formally and uniformly changing the 
current IRS standards is to allow each economic development 
organization seeking 501(c)(3) status to devise its own 
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standards for accomplishing the appropriate balance between 
public and private benefit and to justify them in its application 
for recognition of 501(c)(3) status. This strategy recognizes that 
economic development encompasses many different types of 
activities in many different contexts and, thus, a one-size-fits-
all solution may not be adequate. Great Britain uses this 
approach in regulating its equivalent of charitable economic 
development organizations.236 
Although subject to the risk that an organization will 
only craft a standard that it will meet, the fact that the 
organization would have to explain and defend its standard in 
its 1023 application ensures that the IRS would at least have 
an opportunity to scrutinize the organization’s methodology. 
This concern could also be addressed by requiring that the 
organization provide objective data and/or third-party opinions 
substantiating the validity of its standards. 
3. Regulating Board Composition to Incorporate 
Interests of the Charitable Class  
An even more indirect method of addressing the 
concerns identified in Part IV would be to require that the 
board of directors (Board) of 501(c)(3) economic development 
organizations consist of a majority of individuals selected from 
the charitable class that the organization intends to serve. 
Harkening back to the model utilized in Community Economic 
Development, the reasoning is that a Board that is 
representative of a charitable class will be less likely to stray 
from the underlying mission of serving that class.237 In 
isolation, this strategy involves neither change to the current 
substantive standards comprising the private benefit doctrine 
nor any increased role for the IRS. Instead, it relies heavily on 
the Board—the constituent body charged with stewardship of 
an organization’s charitable mission—to exercise judgment in 
striking the right balance between the public and private 
benefit generated by the organization’s activities.238 
 
 236 The Review of the Register of Charities: Promotion of Urban and Rural 
Regeneration, Charity Commission (Mar. 1999), http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/
media/95169/rr2text.pdf. 
 237 See Clark, supra, note 43. 
 238 Members of nonprofit Boards of Directors owe a duty of obedience to carry 
out the purposes of the organization as expressed in its articles of incorporation. 
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 209, at 198. 
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Congress recently utilized a similar type of an approach 
for 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations engaged in credit 
counseling out of a concern that these organizations often 
operate primarily to further the interests of for-profit companies 
to which the organizations refer their clients.239 Congress added 
501(q) to the Internal Revenue Code requiring that the Boards 
of credit counseling organizations be “controlled” by “persons 
who represent the broad interests of the public,” and limiting 
how many Board members can be employed by the organization 
or financial beneficiaries of its activities.240 
4. Requiring Periodic Board Certification of Adequate 
Public Benefit  
This is another strategy that utilizes an economic 
development organization’s Board to ensure that the 
organization satisfies the private benefit doctrine. In this case, a 
Board would be required to periodically review the activities of 
the organization and determine whether these activities yield 
the appropriate balance between public and private benefit. 
Each Board member would then have to certify or dissent from a 
statement that, in the Board’s opinion, the organization strikes 
an appropriate balance. The organization would disclose the 
results of this certification process on its annual Form 990. 
This approach most closely reflects the spirit of 
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms for publicly traded corporations241 and 
it reinforces provisions in the IRS model conflict-of-interest 
policy for Board members of 501(c)(3) organizations.242 The 
onus is clearly on individual Board members to participate in 
due diligence on an organization’s business assistance 
programs and to understand the relevant jurisprudence of the 
private benefit doctrine in order to have a reasonable basis for 
making the certification. However, as with the immediately 
preceding strategy, one might fairly question whether 
individual Board members will have sufficient time and legal 
acumen to effectively make these types of assessments. 
 
 239 I.R.C. § 501(q) (2010). 
 240 I.R.C. § 501 (q)(1)(D) (2010). 
 241 See A.B.A. COORDINATING COMM. ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO 
NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF SARBANES-OXLEY 5-6 (2005). 
 242 See I.R.S., Instructions for Form 1023, Article VI (2013). 
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5. Expanding Disclosure Requirements on the Annual 
Information Return  
The IRS could revise Form 990 to elicit more specific 
information from economic development organizations about 
their activities, including the names, types, and locations of 
businesses they assist; the forms of aid they provide; the 
number and types of jobs this aid creates; and other 
information relevant to understanding the relative public and 
private benefit generated by the organization’s activities. Form 
990 currently contains several schedules to the main form 
designed specifically for the purpose of gathering additional 
information from particular types of organizations that 
implicate regulatory concerns.243 For example, Schedule H to 
Form 990 requires more detailed responses from hospitals 
about the amount of charitable care and types of community 
benefits they provide.244 This type of requirement for economic 
development organizations would ensure that the IRS, the 
general public and funders have detailed, consistent and up-to-
date information that serves as a basis for evaluating if an 
organization satisfies the private benefit doctrine and, in this 
way, increases the organization’s general accountability as it 
relates to this issue. However, it does not necessarily increase the 
likelihood that the IRS will make use of this data, as the agency 
only examines a very small percentage of the 990s it receives.245 
6. Providing for Periodic IRS Review of an 
Organization’s 501(c)(3) Status  
A more direct way of increasing accountability would be 
to mandate that the IRS periodically review the 501(c)(3) 
status of every economic development organization. This 
strategy recognizes that the IRS can make a more accurate 
assessment of how an organization complies with the private 
benefit doctrine retrospectively, on the basis of actual data 
 
 243 I.R.S., Form 990, Part IV (2013). 
 244 I.R.S., Form 990, Schedule H (2013). 
 245 See Fishman, supra note 20, at 581 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO CHARITABLE AND OTHER 
EXEMPT ORGS. AND STATISTICAL INFO. REGARDING GROWTH AND OVERSIGHT OF THE 
TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR 38 tbl.5 (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-44-04.pdf) 
(reporting that IRS is able to examine less than 2% of Form 990s filed); see also 
Elizabeth Schwinn & Grant Williams, A Challenge for the IRS: Lack of Funds and 
Manpower Taxes Agency’s Ability to Regulate Charities, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 
23, 2001), http://philanthropy.com/article/A-Challenge-for-the-IRS/54046/.  
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about the organization’s operations, rather than just relying on 
the organization’s projections in its Form 1023. It also ensures 
that every organization at some point is called to account for 
how it satisfies the doctrine. This is actually a familiar concept 
in the economic development arena; government agencies 
usually demand evidence of measurable results when they 
provide job creation assistance to for-profit businesses, and often 
claw back these benefits when a business does not carry through 
on its projections.246 As for charities, recently Congress, as part 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, required that 
the IRS review the tax exempt status of each 501(c)(3) hospital 
every three years to ensure that it is providing an appropriate 
level of charitable care.247 This review, the details of which are 
still being worked out by the IRS, will amount to less than a 
full re-examination of the organization and may focus 
primarily on the disclosures the organization has made in its 
annual Schedule H to Form 990.248 
C. Considerations 
The strategies described above vary in terms of who 
bears responsibility for carrying them out, the “cost” of 
implementation, and the breadth of the standards, to name a 
few. It is also critical to bear in mind the “harm” we are 
attempting to resolve—the misuse of the charitable subsidy 
caused by imprecision in determining when economic 
development is charitable. Selecting and crafting one or more 
strategies into an effective solution necessitates prioritizing 
among these various considerations (some of which, when 
considered alone, could lead to significantly different solutions). 
In light of the concerns raised in this article, the following 
considerations are the most important: 
 
 246 See Lerch, supra note 205 at 1-9. (discussing states’ passage of legislation 
intended to provide greater accountability). 
 247 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 
124 Stat. 119, 855 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 501(r) (2010)). 
 248 Kurt Bennion, New Details on IRS Reviews of the Community Benefit 
Activities of 501(c)(3) Hospitals, Clifton Larson Allen (Oct. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.cliftonlarsonallen.com/Health-Care/New-Details-on-IRS-Review-of-the-
Community-Benefit-Activities-of-501c3-Hospitals.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) 
(reporting on revelation by IRS official in October 2012 that IRS will conduct “stealth” 
reviews of one-third of hospitals every year based initially solely on their Form 990s 
and other public records without notifying the hospitals when the reviews take place). 
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1. Accuracy 
One of this article’s central contentions is that the 
jurisprudential standards the IRS employs in determining 
when economic development is charitable are too outdated and 
imprecise. They provide no established analytic structure for 
evaluating economic development organizations, allowing IRS 
agents to take a largely intuitive and discretionary approach to 
applying the private benefit doctrine. This, in turn, has led to 
outcomes that fail to meaningfully reflect the types of activities 
Section 501(c)(3) should allow and prohibit. For a category of 
organizations that provide aid to for-profit businesses with the 
objective that benefit eventually trickles down to a charitable 
class, the private benefit doctrine is not just a tangential 
subplot, but rather the lead story line in whether or not the 
organization is charitable. A sound solution should provide the 
ultimate decision-maker with enough information and the 
proper analytic tools to make good judgments about who is 
entitled to the charitable subsidy. The decision maker also 
needs to have the legal acumen and breadth of experience to 
accurately determine when the doctrine is satisfied. 
2. Consistency  
Closely aligned with, and yet distinct from, accuracy is 
consistency in decision-making to ensure that the private 
benefit doctrine is given equal weight among all economic 
development organizations seeking 501(c)(3) status. This is 
critical to increasing the precision of the IRS in evaluating 
these organizations. Furthermore, any perceived inconsistency 
will undoubtedly lead to organizations seeking the path of least 
resistance. For example, it is not difficult to imagine an 
organization adding government officials to its board of 
directors if organizations that lessen governmental burdens are 
subject to less scrutiny under the private benefit doctrine. 
3. Flexibility 
Recognizing that different economic development 
organizations provide different types of services (e.g. financing, 
technical assistance, incubator space) to different types of 
businesses (e.g. small retail stores, Biotech startups, growing 
manufacturers) in geographical areas of different sizes and 
facing different challenges, the ultimate solution needs to be 
flexible enough to allow for the accomplishment of charitable 
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economic development in a variety of circumstances. On the one 
hand, flexibility in standards might be viewed as conflicting with 
the preference for accuracy and consistency articulated in 
considerations (1) and (2) above. On the other, however, 
flexibility does not refer to how vigorously or consistently the 
standards would be applied, but rather to creating an approach 
that does not become so formulaic that it fails to accommodate 
the wide range of economic development practices one might 
fairly consider charitable. This consideration militates against 
strict numeric tests (for example, 80% of jobs created must be 
filled by low-income individuals) or narrowly drawn categories of 
permissible activities (for example, below-market loans to 
businesses owned exclusively by members of minority groups). 
4. Accountability  
Another central contention of this article is that there is 
no real mechanism to hold an organization accountable with 
respect to the private benefit doctrine after it has received 
recognition of its 501(c)(3) status. As explained throughout this 
article, the lack of ongoing accountability renders the doctrine 
fairly meaningless for economic development organizations. 
Any solution must address this problem. As with any 
accountability mechanism, the solution must be carefully 
crafted so that it elicits the right information and yet is not so 
onerous that it discourages organizations from pursuing valid 
charitable objectives or significantly detracts from their ability 
to accomplish them. 
5. Sensitivity to Regulatory Resources 
Although an annual review by the IRS of the activities 
of every one of the country’s over one million 501(c)(3) 
organizations would no doubt increase the agency’s precision in 
determining which organizations merit 501(c)(3) status, it 
would tax the resources of the IRS Exempt Organizations 
Division well beyond capacity.249 Any solution that requires 
 
 249 Fishman, supra note 20, at 581 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO CHARITABLE AND OTHER 
EXEMPT ORGS. AND STATISTICAL INFO. REGARDING GROWTH AND OVERSIGHT OF THE 
TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR 38 table 5 (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-44-
04.pdf) (reporting that IRS is able to examine less than 2% of Form 990s filed); see also 
Elizabeth Schwinn & Grant Williams, A Challenge for the IRS: Lack of Funds and 
Manpower Taxes Agency’s Ability to Regulate Charities, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY 
(Aug. 23, 2001), http://philanthropy.com/article/A-Challenge-for-the-IRS/54046/. 
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more agency involvement will result in some increase in 
administrative costs and the greater the scope of this 
involvement, the more unlikely the IRS will be able to bear it. 
Similarly, a solution that shifts the regulatory burden to others 
(like Boards) must take into account the challenges this would 
pose to the organizations at issue in identifying Board 
members with the time and expertise to play this role. So, 
accountability must be balanced with regulatory cost. 
VI. THE SOLUTION 
As argued throughout this article, the problem with the 
current approach to assessing place-based economic 
development as charitable is multi-faceted and, thus, so is the 
solution. It involves corresponding changes to both the current 
jurisprudence and to the practices the IRS utilizes in evaluating 
and monitoring economic development organizations with a 
primary objective of improving the agency’s precision in 
determining which ones are charitable while staying mindful of 
the other considerations prioritized in Section V. 
My recommended solution includes the following features: 
(a) the formal adoption by the IRS of more nuanced 
standards for evaluating charitable place-based 
economic development emphasizing more clearly the 
need for a strong nexus between the aid the 
organization provides to businesses and the direct 
alleviation of community economic distress; 
and 
(b) an enhanced process that all place-based economic 
development organizations claiming 501(c)(3) status 
must adhere to so that the IRS is better equipped to 
apply the standards described in part (a) above both 
when the organization applies for 501(c)(3) status 
and on an ongoing basis. This process would include: 
• the submission by the organization of (i) a 
written community economic hardship 
assessment, identifying specific hardships 
related to the growth, attraction, or 
retention of businesses in the particular 
community the organization aims to 
serve, and (ii) a detailed action plan 
explaining with specificity how the 
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organization’s activities will address the 
hardships identified in this assessment, 
• which are reviewed by the IRS at the time of 
the organization’s application for 501(c)(3) 
status and periodically thereafter, and 
• which are reported on annually in the 
organization’s Form 990 via a separate 
schedule. 
This solution combines several of the possible strategies 
discussed in Part V(B). and it bears some resemblance to the 
new framework for the regulation of 501(c)(3) hospitals 
recently implemented by the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (the PPACA),250 with a heightened sensitivity to 
minimizing the additional regulatory burden on the IRS. A 
discussion of each of the critical features follows below. 
A. Updating the Standards 
As the primary arbiters of which organizations are 
recognized as charities, it is important that IRS agents have 
clear markers for making these determinations, especially 
when dealing with categories of organizations that present a 
regulatory challenge. Part III(A) of this article points to 
difficulties in applying all aspects of the IRS’s 1970s era 
jurisprudential standards to modern day REDOs. While 
effectively modernizing these standards is easier said than 
done, good starting points would be for the IRS to (1) formally 
require that an economic development charity provide objective 
evidence that the entire area it plans to serve is suffering from 
economic distress, and (2) formally adopt a standard akin to 
the expanded analysis contained in its long cast-aside 1992 
General Counsel Memorandum referenced in Part III(A).251 
This Memorandum provided that an economic development 
charity must show a strong nexus between the businesses it 
will aid and addressing the specific economic hardships 
encountered by the area it will serve. 
As to the first suggestion, the goal is to provide IRS 
agents with some objective basis for distinguishing between 
 
 250 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code and Internal Revenue Code). 
 251 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 16, 1992). 
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areas of the country that are in need of some form of charitable 
economic aid from those that are not. In its current 
instructions to the application for recognition of 501(c)(3) 
status, the IRS hints that this may already be a part of its 
practice. The instructions suggest that an economic 
development organization that seeks to “combat community 
deterioration” should describe whether the area in which it 
plans to operate “ha[s] been declared blighted or economically 
depressed by a government finding” and, if it has not, consider 
whether an exemption under another subpart of Section 501(c) 
is more appropriate.252 Expressly adopting, in a Revenue 
Ruling, a threshold like this as part of a test for qualifying as a 
charity makes good sense, as does broadening it to include 
similar findings by objective, third-party experts like qualified 
universities and research institutions. It establishes that, at a 
minimum, place-based charitable economic development must 
be directed at places suffering actual distress, and sets a 
baseline for what qualifies as adequate substantiation of this 
fact. Another alternative would be to tie the threshold more 
narrowly to a definition of economic distress in a particular 
statute or to a particular type of government finding. However, 
this may run the risk of too narrowly constraining the range of 
circumstances that constitute distress. 
The second suggestion addresses a critical concern 
identified in Part IV(A) by requiring that an economic 
development organization like a REDO demonstrate that it has 
carefully tailored its assistance to for-profit enterprises to best 
meet the needs of the distressed in the area it serves. General 
Counsel Memorandum 39,883 contains the strongest IRS 
statement to date that a more liberal form of trickle down 
charity (essentially, aiding any businesses in a distressed area 
on the theory that increased economic activity in and of itself 
will produce some degree of public benefit) is not charity.253 
This Memorandum also emphasized the need for two additional 
“nexus characteristics” in order to demonstrate eligibility for 
501(c)(3) status: (1) the assistance provided to businesses must 
not be available from conventional sources because of the 
depressed nature of the area, and (2) the businesses aided must 
offer the “greatest community potential benefit” based on the 
problems experienced by that area.254 
 
 252 I.R.S., Instructions for Form 1023, Part VIII, line 6a (2006). 
 253 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 16, 1992). 
 254 Id. 
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Within these characteristics reside standards that are 
clearer for aspiring economic development charities to 
demonstrate satisfaction of, and for IRS agents to apply. First, 
the organization must show a shortage or inadequacy of 
whatever assistance it plans to provide to area businesses and 
that this shortfall is a result of location in an economically 
distressed area. One could conceive of an organization 
demonstrating this by comparing resources in the area it plans 
to serve to those of more economically prosperous areas. Second, 
the organization must demonstrate a strong link between the 
businesses it aids and the particular forms of distress suffered 
by the area it serves. General Counsel Memorandum 39,883 
use of the phrase “greatest community benefit”255 indicates that 
an incidental or even a moderate link between the businesses 
aided and the problems faced by the community at issue is not 
enough; the nexus must be strong. The organization should be 
able to show that the success of the businesses it aids will have a 
clearly measurable and important impact on those suffering the 
effects of economic distress in the area it serves. 
Up until this point, discussion of this change in 
standards has focused on economic development organizations 
that seek 501(c)(3) status on the basis of aiding distressed people 
and places. For organizations like these, there is fairly clear 
logic to imposing the more exacting standards discussed above.  
But what about those REDOs that claim to lessen 
governmental burdens? These types of charities are also 
governed by the private benefit doctrine; but they can argue that 
they achieve considerable public benefit simply by reducing the 
cost of government to taxpayers.256 The charitable class of an 
organization like this conceivably includes all citizens, not just 
those that are distressed. 
However, the private benefit doctrine does not assess 
public benefit alone. It assesses public benefit relative to 
private benefit.257 Economic development practices that provide 
assistance directly to private businesses yield substantial 
private benefit. As a result, if the quantitative component of 
the private benefit doctrine is to have any meaning, these 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 See Lars Gustafsson, “Lessening the Burdens of Government”: Formulating a Test 
for Uniformity and Rational Federal Income Tax Subsidies, 45 U. KAN. L. REV 787, 833 (1997) 
(suggesting that the application of the private benefit doctrine may be unnecessary for 
organizations able to demonstrate that they lessen governmental burdens as this 
demonstration itself should already suffice in satisfying the private benefit doctrine). 
 257 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii) (2008). 
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practices must yield public benefit so significant that, by 
comparison, the private benefit appears insubstantial.258 
Reducing the cost of government, expanding the local tax base, 
and promoting business activity for the economic betterment of 
all those who reside in a community provide some measure of 
public benefit and, as a matter of law, usually provide 
sufficient justification to support the economic development 
acts of government, which are not subject to the private benefit 
doctrine.259 Nevertheless, the limited case law and IRS 
guidance available on this point indicate that the private 
benefit doctrine applicable to charities demands more.260 
I propose that the more exacting standards I propose 
above for economic development organizations that aid the 
distressed should also apply to those that lessen the burdens of 
government. In other words, an organization that directly aids 
private businesses and seeks 501(c)(3) status for doing so 
should first have to demonstrate that the area it serves suffers 
from some form of distress that prevents it from attracting 
businesses and creating jobs, even if the organization’s sole 
claim to charitable status is that it lessens governmental 
burdens. The rationale for requiring this is firmly rooted in the 
myriad theories underlying the existence of the charitable 
subsidy. These theories, as noted earlier, can be collectively 
understood as justifying the subsidy as necessary to incentivize 
the provision of meritorious and publicly beneficial goods and 
services that other segments of society are unwilling or unable to 
provide.261 In economically healthy regions, one would expect that 
emerging and existing businesses with strong potential for growth 
attract capital, technical assistance, and other resources from 
banks, venture capital firms, and other private sector players on 
commercially reasonable terms. Private sector players in these 
regions are already sufficiently incentivized and able to determine 
which businesses are viable and to provide them with the 
 
 258 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862. 
 259 See Anne C. Choe, Blinson v. State and the Continued Erosion of the Public 
Purpose Doctrine in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L. REV. 644 (2009) (discussing the “public 
purpose doctrine” that governs the economic development activities of government). 
 260 See Quality Auditing Co. v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 498, 510 (2000) (private benefit 
doctrine provides an “exception” to rule that organizations that lessen governmental 
burden fulfill charitable purposes); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,693 (Apr. 15, 
1981) (casting doubt on whether organization that promotes local economic development 
would qualify under 501(c)(3) even if it in fact lessened governmental burdens due to 
amount of benefit businesses receive from organization’s activities). 
 261 See supra note 209. 
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necessary resources to launch. Thus, there is no need to subsidize 
charitable organizations to play this role. 
Furthermore, using the charitable subsidy to incentivize 
the creation and attraction of jobs in already healthy economies 
may undermine other efforts to create and attract jobs in regions 
with distressed economies. Federal tax credits, exemptions, and 
other programs aimed at job creation and business formation are 
usually directed toward areas experiencing some level of 
economic distress.262 Simultaneously utilizing the charitable 
subsidy, which is largely federally funded, to aid the efforts of 
state and local governments to increase commercial activity in 
areas with healthy economies seems contradictory.  
A similar sentiment is often reflected in court cases and 
IRS materials addressing 501(c)(3) organizations that drift too 
far into territory where the private sector is functioning 
normally. In one of the few publicly available IRS rulings 
applying the private benefit doctrine to an organization 
claiming to lessen governmental burdens, the IRS opined, 
“because the activity engaged in by the subject organization is 
in a general area which is traditionally commercial (although 
the subject organization may very well be non-commercial), 
extreme caution should be exercised before an exempt status is 
awarded.”263 In a similar vein, the IRS stressed to its agents 
that they use “extreme caution” whenever asked by an 
economic development organization to approve its 501(c)(3) 
status using “a lessening the burdens rationale,” presumably 
out of a concern that it is difficult to justify activity that simply 
aims to promote commerce as charitable.264 As a general 
matter, courts and the IRS have interpreted Section 501(c)(3) 
to altogether exclude organizations that conduct activities 
substantially similar to those conducted by for-profit 
businesses or that operate with a distinctive “commercial hue” 
(this is known as the “commerciality doctrine”).265 
Nonetheless, the IRS has not yet incorporated this 
sentiment into anything resembling a meaningful standard for 
economic development organizations that base their claim to 
charitable status on lessening the burdens of government. 
Requiring this type of an organization to show that the area it 
plans to serve is distressed is a good starting point for making 
 
 262 See Simon, supra note 8, at 380. 
 263 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,685 (Sept. 17, 1986). 
 264 Louthian & Friedlander, supra note 177, at 8. 
 265 See, e.g., Airlie Found. v. I.R.S., 283 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2003); B.S.W. 
Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978). 
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a case that it satisfies the private benefit doctrine as it clearly 
links aid to private businesses with a substantiated public 
need. To make a full case the organization would have to show, 
like the organizations basing their claim on aiding the 
distressed, a strong nexus between the businesses it aids and 
improving economic distress. 
B. Improving the Process 
Holding economic development organizations to higher 
and more nuanced standards requires that those organizations 
provide the IRS with more and better information about their 
objectives and activities. Accordingly, my recommended solution 
requires that this type of an organization submit a (1) 
community economic hardship assessment and (2) action plan, 
which would be reviewed by the IRS upon application for 
501(c)(3) status. Furthermore, the organization would annually 
report on the accomplishment of its action plan in its Form 990 
and the IRS would periodically review these reports. More detail 
about each of the key aspects of this approach follows below: 
1. Community Economic Hardship Assessment 
This is a concept borrowed from the PPACA, which 
requires that a hospital prepare an assessment of the health 
needs of the community, which it serves every three years in 
order to be treated as a charitable 501(c)(3) organization.266 
Economic development organizations seeking charitable status 
should likewise have to engage in an assessment of the 
conditions for business creation, cultivation, and retention in 
the communities they plan to serve. A critical distinction here 
is that the organization would have to identify more than just 
the “need” for jobs or companies within the community; every 
community wants and arguably needs more business activity 
and better jobs. The assessment would have to include a 
government finding or other objective third-party opinion 
(described in Part VI(A) above) that the area the organization 
will serve suffers from economic distress. The assessment 
would also have to describe the specific hardships that result 
from this distress—like unusually high unemployment or 
poverty rates, unusually low educational attainment statistics, 
significant numbers of blighted properties, or other hardships 
 
 266 I.R.C. §§ 501(r)(1)(A) and (3)(A)(i) (2010). 
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within the community intended to be served—as a foundation 
for justifying the types of businesses the organization will aid. 
The community could be defined by geography or by 
demographically identifiable segments of a population 
experiencing a hardship. The community could occupy areas 
large or small; the focus during the organization’s IRS review 
would be on the severity and pervasiveness of the hardship 
faced by the identified area rather than necessarily on the size 
of the area served. At the same time, however, as discussed 
below, the organization will need to show that the businesses it 
plans to aid will have a direct and measurable impact on 
alleviating the identified hardships. 
2. Action Plan 
Another concept borrowed from the new framework for 
regulating 501(c)(3) hospitals is that of an action plan closely 
linking the activities of the organization to the community 
hardships identified in the assessment.267 This is how the 
organization will demonstrate that it meets the “strong nexus” 
requirement. For example, if the hardship is that a community 
is experiencing high unemployment due to a poorly educated 
work force, the organization’s action plan would need to show 
how the businesses it plans to aid would alleviate this 
particular type of unemployment. 
The action plan would also need to include projections 
quantifying the value of the aid the organization plans to offer 
to businesses and the charitable economic impact of this aid. 
This type of information is commonly requested by government 
agencies that make grants, loans, tax abatements, and/or tax 
credits to for-profit businesses as a way of rationalizing the 
decisions the agencies make.268 It is reasonable to expect that 
501(c)(3) economic development organizations would likewise 
provide some evidence of the charitable value generated by the 
tax subsidy they receive and pass along to for profit enterprises. 
The requirements for the community economic hardship 
assessment and action plan are closely tied to satisfying the 
updated standards articulated in Part VI(A) and, by so doing, 
the private benefit doctrine. These requirements add critical 
content that the IRS can utilize to determine whether the 
qualitative and quantitative components of the doctrine are 
 
 267 I.R.C. § 501(r)(3)(A)(ii) (2010). 
 268 See, e.g., Lerch, supra note 205. 
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satisfied. The qualitative component requires that any private 
benefit be a “necessary concomitant” of the public benefit 
achieved.269 Requiring a clear identification of community 
hardships and an action plan that establishes a clear nexus to 
resolution of those hardships helps to satisfy this component. 
Requiring that an organization make a rough calculation of the 
private and public benefit its activities achieve provides a more 
substantive and consistent format for satisfying the quantitative 
component.270 At the same time, these requirements help to 
satisfy the preference for flexibility described in Part V(C)(3). The 
assessment and action plan would allow an organization to craft a 
unique portfolio of programming and intended outcomes to best 
match the economic hardships faced by the community it serves. 
3. Subject to Initial and Subsequent Periodic IRS 
Reviews 
A charitable economic development organization would 
submit its community economic hardship assessment and 
action plan when it applies for 501(c)(3) status. Recognition by 
the IRS of the organization’s 501(c)(3) status would essentially 
constitute an endorsement by the IRS that, if the organization 
conducts its activities consistent with these documents, it 
satisfies the private benefit doctrine. If the organization were 
to make any material change to either of these documents, it 
would need to submit the updated versions with its annual 
Form 990. In this way, economic development charities would 
be treated similarly to other 501(c)(3) organizations except in 
terms of the amount of information required.271 In recognition, 
however, of the increased need for long-term accountability by 
charities engaged in economic development, the IRS would 
periodically re-examine the 501(c)(3) status of all economic 
development organizations on a rolling basis. 
This feature, of course, raises a concern about IRS 
resources.272 Relying instead on the boards of these 
organizations, the general public, and/or funders to monitor 
their activities, as several of the other strategies discussed in 
Part V do, are certainly cheaper alternatives for achieving some 
measure of long-term accountability. These alternative 
 
 269 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
 270 Id. 
 271 I.R.S., Form 990, Part III, Line 2 (requiring that an organization report 
significant additions to its services). 
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strategies raise other difficulties, however. It is unlikely that 
Board members or the general public possess the legal acumen 
necessary to accurately assess an organization’s activities 
under the private benefit doctrine. Board members might be 
inclined to support an organization in any case as a matter of 
self-interest or to avoid undermining an organization in which 
they are heavily involved. Individual members of the general 
public cannot impose significant consequences on an organization 
that fails to satisfy the private benefit doctrine. While funders can 
cease providing financial support, this assumes that the funders 
are inclined to make this type of review and carry through on 
consequences, which, while plausible, is less certain and 
consistent than if the IRS plays a prominent role. 
The recognition by an organization that it will have its 
501(c)(3) status re-examined by the IRS at certain points in its 
lifespan creates a higher measure of accountability, but at a 
higher cost. To an extent, it is fair to expect the IRS to devote 
the level of resources necessary to carry out its responsibility 
as gate keeper of the charitable subsidy. At the same time, 
however, this cost can be contained to an extent by limiting the 
scope of the IRS review solely to the organization’s compliance 
with the private benefit doctrine. Most, if not all, of the 
information necessary to conduct this review—that is, any 
updates to the community economic hardship assessment and 
action plan and yearly reports on the organization’s 
accomplishment of the action plan (which enhanced 990 
reporting will provide as described below)—would already be in 
the hands of the IRS. Finally, because the reviews would be 
done on a rolling basis rather than according to a fixed 
schedule, the IRS would have flexibility in terms of how often it 
conducts these reviews. 
4. Reported on Form 990 
The principal reporting mechanism to ensure an 
economic development organization’s accountability under the 
private benefit doctrine would be a specialized schedule that 
the organization would need to complete each year and attach 
to its Form 990. The schedule would elicit specific information 
related to the organization’s accomplishment of the objectives 
set forth in its action plan including, for example, the names 
and types of businesses the organization aided during the 
previous year, the forms of assistance it provided, criteria for 
determining eligibility for assistance, and statistics on the 
number and types of jobs created as a result of this assistance. 
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In addition to making it easier for the IRS to periodically 
review the organization, the schedule would provide some 
measure of accountability by the organization to the general 
public and funders. Furthermore, the process of having to 
review its operations each year with respect to the specific 
objectives set out in its community economic hardship 
assessment and action plan, and report on this to the IRS and 
the general public should serve to continually refocus the 
organization on the basis for its charitable status. 
CONCLUSION 
By its own terms, the private benefit doctrine defies 
precise application. Yet there are circumstances, ever 
increasingly as the intersection of the private and charitable 
sectors expand, where a primarily intuitive, one-time application 
of the doctrine falls short and risks serious misuse of our 
nation’s charitable subsidy. Such is the case with “charitable” 
economic development where aid from charities to for-profit 
businesses must trickle down to charitable beneficiaries. At the 
same time that charitable economic development poses a special 
regulatory challenge for the IRS, it also plays a vital role in the 
revitalization of our nation’s distressed regions that should not 
be discouraged by imposing overly burdensome regulation. The 
solution proposed in Part VI helps to more effectively assess 
when economic development is charitable in the way the law 
intends, and ensure that organizations that engage in it are 
accountable over their entire lifespan, without hindering their 
performance of charitable work. 
